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PARADOX AND PANDORA'S BOX:
THE TRAGEDY OF CURRENT
RIGHT-TO-DIE JURISPRUDENCE
Cathaleen A. Roach*

Sadly, private tragedy creates many an unwitting public
figure, as demonstrated by the current "right-to-die" or "deathwith-dignity" debate. Increasingly, this debate thrusts private
grief into a public forum. Nancy Cruzan, for example, became
an American household name after the national news media
focused attention on her right-to-die case, which culminated in
June 1990 with the United States Supreme Court decision in
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health.'
The Court, however has not, nor could it have, resolved this
national debate in a single right-to-die decision.2 Less than
six months after Cruzan, the nation was once again riveted by
two new cases: In re Conservatorship of Wanglie3 (heraldedby some as a "reverse Cruzan" case because in Wanglie the
hospital sought to terminate life support over the vociferous
objections of the patient's family4 ) and In re Busalacchi,5 a
Missouri case which is hauntingly resonant of Justice
Stevens's dissenting opinion in Cruzan.6 Helga Wanglie and
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1.
110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
2.
The Court recognized that it may resolve only the issues and facts of the case
or controversy before it and was thus precluded from addressing all of the issues
involved in this complex debate. See Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2851.
3.
No. PX-91-283 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 28, 1991); see also Lynn Wagner, Ruling
Leaves DecisionsAbout Medical Carein Hands ofFamily, MOD. HEALTHCARE, July 8,
1991, at 3 (reporting on the background of the Wanglie case).
4.
See Susan Tifft, Life and Death After Cruzan, TIME, Jan. 21, 1991, at 67
("The Wanglie case is the reverse image of the controversy that surrounded Nancy
Cruzan. . . .");
At Odds with Family,Hospital Seeks to End Life, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 10,
1991, § 1, at 4 ("'This is the opposite of Cruzan,' said Arthur Caplan, director of the
Center for Biomedical Ethics at the University of Minnesota ... ."). The family
members vigorously asserted that they and Helga Wanglie believed that only God
should make such a determination and that Helga told them she would not want
anything done to shorten her life in the event of her future incapacity. See Robert
Steinbrook, Hospital or Family: Who Decides the Right to Die?, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 17,
1991, at Al; Tifft, supra, at 67.
5.
No. 59582, 1991 Mo. App. LEXIS 315, 1991 WL 26851 (Mar. 5, 1991).
6.
See 110 S. Ct. at 290-91 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the problems
of patients who have never been competent to express their wishes).
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Christine Busalacchi became two new public figures, whose
private tragedies were destined to play themselves out in
public and judicial forums. Courts and legislatures across the
country are confronting the legal parameters of an individual's
right to die with dignity, as well as the rights of an
individual's family members in that decision-making process.
It is apparent, therefore, that Cruzan has not settled the
question of the right to die. Instead, according to some, it
represents the opening of a "Pandora's box,"7 filled with
pernicious and troubling legal, medical, and moral issues, and
further exposes the paradox' and complexity of the debate.
Christine Busalacchi's father expresses that paradox with his
lament that although those who know his daughter best know
exactly what she would want, the ultimate decision will be
made by those who never knew her.9 It is also paradoxical
that Christine Busalacchi, through her father, seeks transfer
to Minnesota so that she might be evaluated and possibly
allowed to die, while Helga Wanglie's family struggled in
Minnesota in order that Helga Wanglie might live.' °
Following Cruzan, many individuals in this country remain
unprotected from the tragedy that befell Nancy Cruzan and
her family. In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor
directs the nation back to "the 'laboratory' of the States.""
As I discuss below, however, the majority opinion in Cruzan
sends these cases back to the states without providing a
constitutional floor for physically or mentally incompetent
individuals below which all are protected and above which
2
states may not interfere absent a compelling state interest.1

7.
Tifft, supra note 4, at 67.
8.
Linda Matchan, Court Upholds a State's Limit on Right to Die: A Father
Joins Ethicists' Outcry, BOSTON GLOBE, June 26, 1990, at 1, 10; see also Ellen
Goodman, The High-Tech Twilight Zone, BOSTON GLOBE, June 28, 1990, at 15 ("'You
can treat someone without her consent, but you can't stop treating her without
consent.'" (quoting medical ethicist George Annas)).
9.
Matchan, supra note 8, at 1. It is also ironic that Christine Busalacchi is
cared for in the same hospital which housed Nancy Cruzan, id., and that she seeks
transfer to Helga Wanglie's hospital in Minnesota. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
10.
See infra notes 74-94 and accompanying text.
11.
110 S. Ct. at 2859 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
12.
The Supreme Court in Cruzan stated in dicta that there may be constitutional protection for the right to death with dignity for incompetent individuals who
have created, during their previous competency, sufficient evidence of their personal
wishes as to the removal of life-support systems. 110 S. Ct. at 2852, 2854-55; see
also infra notes 40-42 and accompanying text. There is tremendous disparity
between the states as to what types of advance health-care directives are recognized
as legally sufficient. See infra notes 161-63. The majority opinion by Justice
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Moreover, for patients who have not previously provided
sufficient evidence of their own wishes regarding whether or
not to continue life-prolonging treatment, Cruzan provides no
constitutional protection. The Court thus leaves a large
number of Americans virtually unprotected because these
persons will not or cannot act preemptively to avoid a Cruzanlike tragedy.
In addition to leaving large numbers of persons unprotected,
simply directing the nation to "the laboratory of the states" is
inadequate because the existing state legislative piecemeal
approach has resulted in a confusing smorgasbord of separate
legislation for advance health-care directives, 3 including
living wills 4 and proxy appointments for health care.' 5
This patchwork response creates inequity, 6 confusion, and

Rehnquist provided that states may require the heightened evidentiary standard of
clear and convincing evidence of a patient's wishes, and they may choose to defer only
to the patient's expressed wishes and not repose substituted judgment with family
members. 110 S. Ct. at 2855. Thus, individual states appear to be free to provide
greater protection than that discussed in Cruzan, but they are not constitutionally
compelled to do so.
Throughout this article the term "advance health-care directives" will refer
13.
to all current statutory provisions which allow an individual, while competent, to
authorize in advance the course of her medical treatment in the event she later
becomes ill and is incompetent to decide at that time. As such, advance health-care
directives encompass living-will directives, proxy appointments for health care, and
durable power of attorney appointments for health care.
14.
A "living will" is a previously executed document which directs physicians to
withhold or withdraw specific types of medical treatment in the event of a "terminal
illness." States vary on when "terminal illness" ensues and what types of medical
treatment may be withdrawn or withheld. See generally Marguerite A. Chapman,
The Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act: Too Little, Too Late?, 42 ARK. L. REV.
319, 374-84 (1989).
15.
In the health-care context, proxy appointments and durable power of attorney
directives identify an agent who is expressly authorized by the patient to make decisions on the patient's behalf regarding health care and the withdrawal of medical
treatment in the event of his later incompetency. Generally, proxy appointment
provisions may be found in a state's Living Will or Natural Death Act, and durable
power of attorney statutes are listed elsewhere in a state's Probate Code. There is
tremendous variation among the states as to whether such directives are recognized at
all, and if so, under what conditions. See infra notes 166-86 and accompanying text.
16.
Such a smorgasbord creates inequity because the 50 states and the District
of Columbia vary tremendously in the type of protection they provide their citizens.
See infra notes 166-86 and accompanying text. Moreover, only 12 states recognize
the enforceability of advance health-care directives executed in a sister state. See
infra note 174 and accompanying text. Thus, a citizen is not guaranteed that a
lawfully executed advance health-care directive will be enforceable should she move
to a new state. See Larry Tye, Varying Laws on Life, Death Spur Quests for Best
State, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 6, 1991, at 1, 72 ("'Now, basic rights change when you
move across state borders.'" (quoting Ronald Collins, visiting professor of law at
Catholic University in Washington, D.C.)).
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forum shopping.17 In short, the "state laboratories" have
failed to provide an effective or uniform framework for the
American people. The Court's decision to simply return the
problem to the states will only worsen the national crisis.
Part I of this Article examines the trilogy of recent right-todie cases and contrasts the results of those cases with recent
national opinion polls and statistical surveys of the issue.
Part II examines federal and state legislative responses to the
debate. It suggests that both the courts and legislatures are
out of sync with an emerging national consensus on the deathwith-dignity debate. In fact, the federal legislative response
may only exacerbate the problem. Instead of creating new
rights, it feeds individuals into the existing state network,
which is a quagmire of confusing and inequitable statutory
provisions. Part III examines some recent state legislation
addressing the special problem of patients who have not
created advance health-care directives. Finally, Part IV
proposes a new legislative framework-the "Uniform PatientFamily Determination Rights Act"-which would coordinate
the goals of the recently enacted federal initiative with a
uniform state model framework. This new legislative framework advances three national objectives-"prevention,"
"uniformity," and "patient-family determination rights"-which
must be advanced in order to deal more effectively with this
national problem.
I.

THE TRAGEDY AND THE TRILOGY

Three recent cases, Cruzan v. Director,MissouriDepartment
of Health,i" In re Conservatorship of Wanglie,19 and In re
Busalacchi, ° illustrate the overwhelmingly personal nature

17.
Tye, supra note 16, at 1. For example, in In re Busalacchi, No. 59582, 1991
Mo. App. LEXIS 315, 1991 WL 26851 (Mar. 5, 1991), the court stated:
The issue . . . is whether a guardian properly discharges his duties when he
attempts to move his ward from the jurisdiction of the court for the ostensible
reason of avoiding litigation in Missouri where the decision to remove the
feeding tube from his ward may be subject to heightened legal scrutiny....
Specifically, we will not permit [a] guardian to forum shop in an effort to control
whether Christine lives or dies.
Id. at *16-17, 1991 WL 26851, at *5.
18.
110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
19.
No. PX-91-283 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 28, 1991).
20.
No. 59582, 1991 Mo. App. LEXIS 315, 1991 WL 26851 (Mar. 5, 1991).
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of the decision to withdraw or withhold medical treatment, for
both the individual patient and her family. Questions no less
imposing than "what is life" and "what is death" must be
answered before a competent individual or his family can
determine when life support should cease. In addition to the
deeply personal nature of this inquiry, Cruzan, Wanglie and
Busalacchi tangibly illustrate the need for a coordinated
national prevention effort, as well as the need to create
uniform rules in order to recognize individual and family
rights. I will argue that the proposed legislative framework
discussed in Part IV would likely have kept all three of these
cases out of the courts. As I argue in Part I.D. below, national
polls and statistics demonstrate a need for such a framework.
A. Cruzan v. Director,Missouri Department of Health

In June 1990, the United States Supreme Court for the first
time squarely addressed the issue of the constitutional right
to die in Cruzan v.Director,Missouri Department of Health.2 '

At the age of thirty-three, after a tragic automobile accident,
Nancy Cruzan became a patient in Missouri Rehabilitation
Center, a state hospital in Missouri, where she was diagnosed
as being in a persistent vegetative state.22 Before paramedics arrived at the scene of the accident, Cruzan's brain was
deprived of oxygen for approximately twelve to fourteen
minutes which resulted in severe and permanent brain
damage requiring surgical implementation of a gastrostomy

21.
22.

110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
Id. at 2845. As defined in Cruzan, a persistent vegetative state:

"describes a body which is functioning entirely in terms of its internal controls.
It maintains temperature. It maintains heart beat and pulmonary ventilation.
It maintains digestive activity. It maintains reflex activity of muscles and
nerves for low level conditioned responses. But there is no behavioral evidence
of either self-awareness or awareness of the surroundings in a learned manner."
Id. at 2845 n.1 (quoting In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 438 (N.J. 1987) (quoting Dr. Fred
Plum, creator of the term "persistent vegetative state")); see also American Medical
Ass'n Council on Scientific Affairs and Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs,
Persistent Vegetative State and the Decision to Withdraw or Withhold Life Support,
263 JAMA 426, 427 (1990) [hereinafter Council Report] ("The distinguishing feature
of [persistent vegetative state] is chronic wakefulness without awareness.").
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tube to provide her with food and hydration.2 3 Doctors did
not expect her to regain cognitive awareness.24 Yet by some
estimates, medical technology would have been able to keep
her in this suspended state for as long as thirty years.2 5
According to her parents and close friends, Nancy Cruzan had
indicated before her accident that she would not want to live
on artificial life-support systems.26 Ultimately, her parents
requested that her gastrostomy tube be removed; without it
she was not expected to live. 27 The hospital refused, and the
parents initiated legal action.
The Missouri Supreme Court, sitting en banc, ultimately
reversed the trial court's order granting the Cruzans' request. 2 , Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari "to consider the question of whether Cruzan
has a-right under the United States Constitution which would
require the hospital to withdraw life-sustaining treatment
from her under these circumstances."2 9
The Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that the state of Missouri
could require that there be clear and convincing evidence of an
incompetent patient's 3° previously expressed wishes before
granting authority to terminate life support.3 '
In other
words, a state is not constitutionally compelled to effectuate
an individual's expressed wishes that medical treatment 32 be
withdrawn or withheld absent clear and convincing evidence

23.
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2845.
24.
Id. at 2846.
25.
Id. at 2845 n.1; see also Norman L. Cantor, The Permanently Unconscious
Patient,Non-Feeding and Euthanasia, 15 AM. J.L. & MED. 381, 398 (1989).
26.
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2855.
27.
Id. at 2846.
28.
Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), affd sub nom.
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
29.
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2846.
30.
Throughout this article, the term "incompetent" refers exclusively to those
patients who are in an extended coma-like or persistent vegetative state. See supra
note 22.
31.
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2855-56.
32.
It appears likely that, following Cruzan, "medical treatment" includes the
removal of artificial feeding and hydration. The Rehnquist majority opinion in dicta
included artificial feeding and hydration within the "medical treatment" which may
be withdrawn or withheld. Id. at 2852 ("[Flor purposes of this case, we assume that
the United States Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally
protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition."). Justice O'Connor,
however, expressly included artificial feeding and hydration. Id. at 2857 (O'Connor,
J., concurring) ("Accordingly, the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause must
protect, if it protects anything, an individual's deeply personal decision to reject
medical treatment, including the artificial delivery of food and water.").
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of the same.
Although states are free to effectuate an
individual's previously expressed wishes (oral or written) by
imposing a lesser standard than Missouri's clear and convincing evidentiary standard, or even by recognizing the right of
an individual to expressly appoint a proxy to make that
health-care decision for her in the event of her incompetency, 34 the states are not constitutionally required to do so.
The Court affirmed the Missouri Supreme Court's decision
to remand the case to the trial court for a new evidentiary
hearing which would comport with the clear and convincing
evidentiary standard.3 5 Thereafter, at the trial court, Judge
Teel received additional testimony from at least three new
witnesses who were drawn out by the publicity of the case.36
These witnesses, all co-worker§, testified as to Cruzan's earlier
statements to them, while she was competent, that she would
not want to be kept alive in a vegetable-like condition.3 7
Ultimately, Judge Teel ruled that the petitioners had met
their evidentiary burden and granted the Cruzan family's
petition to remove the gastrostomy tube.3 8 Twelve days later,
Nancy Cruzan died. 39 From the date of her automobile
accident until her death in December 1990, her journey had
taken seven years.
The Supreme Court's decision-the first right-to-die determination coming from the United States Supreme Court 4 0 -is
notable for several reasons, including what the majority opinion
did not say. In his majority opinion,4 1 Justice Rehnquist
"presumed" for the purposes of the opinion that a competent

33.
Id. at 2854-56.
34.
Id. at 2856. Following Cruzan it is unclear, but likely, that express healthcare proxies may also be protected. The majority opinion expressly declined to
address the issue of whether a state may be constitutionally required to recognize a
decision made by a surrogate who was previously identified by the patient while
competent. Id. at 2856 n. 12. But Justice O'Connor noted that the decision "does not
preclude a future determination that the Constitution requires the States to
implement the decisions of a patient's duly appointed surrogate." Id. at 2858
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Thus, there may be a constitutionally protected right to
expressly appoint a proxy for health-care decisions; however, the Court has not yet
declared so.
35.
Id. at 2856.
36.
See Dan J. De Benedictis, Cruzan's Death Doesn't Still Debate, A.B.A. J.,
Mar. 1991, at 26.
37.
Cruzan v. Harmon, Estate No. CV384-9P, slip op. at 4 (Mo. Cir. Ct. July 28,
1988).
38.
Cruzan v. Mouton, Estate No. CV384-9P (Mo. Cir. Ct. Dec. 14, 1990).
39.
De Benedictis, supra note 36, at 26.
40.
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2851.
41.
Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion in which Justices White,
O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy joined. Id. at 2844. Justices O'Connor and Scalia
also wrote separate concurring opinions. Id. at 2856, 2859.
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individual has a constitutional right to die. This right, he
noted, is grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause and liberty interests and not, as some state
courts have held, in the constitutionally recognized right of
privacy.4 2 Nancy Cruzan, however, was no longer competent;
thus, Justice Rehnquist's "presumption" as to competent
individuals did not apply strictly to her case. Justice Rehnquist
also assumed "for purposes of this case" that a constitutionally
protected right to withdraw medical treatment also includes
the right to withdraw or withhold artificial feeding and hydration.43 Thus, the majority did not expressly hold that a
competent individual has a right to terminate medical treatment or that medical treatment includes artificial feeding and
hydration. Justice O'Connor, however, in her concurring
opinion, did expressly include artificial delivery of food and
hydration within the constitutionally protected right to
withdraw medical treatment."
Finally, the majority opinion expressly declined to address
the question of whether express proxy appointments for
health-care decisions must be constitutionally recognized.4 5
A health-care proxy appointment is broader than a living will
because it provides authority for a previously selected party to
act on behalf of the now-incompetent individual in all specified
health-care decisions.46 Strictly speaking, the Court did not
have to reach the issue because Nancy Cruzan never executed
an express advance proxy appointment for health-care
decisions prior to her automobile accident. Justice O'Connor's
concurring opinion, however, expressly left the issue open and
stated that an individual's constitutionally protected right to
refuse medical treatment may include the right to appoint a
named proxy to make that decision in the event an individual
becomes incompetent in the future.4 7

42.
Id. at 2851 n.7.
43.
Id. at 2852.
44.
Id. at 2857 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
45.
Id. at 2856 n.12. But the majority did consider and expressly reject the
Cruzan family's argument that they had a constitutional right to step in on behalf of
Nancy and make the decision on a substituted judgment basis without a previously
executed written proxy directive. Id. at 2855.
46.
See supra notes 14-15.
47.
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2858-59 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor
also noted:
[Such a procedure] may be a valuable additional safeguard of the patient's
interest in directing his [own] medical care. Moreover, as patients are likely to
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Because Nancy Cruzan left neither a written living will nor
a health-care proxy appointment before her automobile
accident left her incompetent, she left no written record of
what her wishes would be in the event she became incompetent. Consequently, her parents, as her co-guardians, argued
that they should be able to substitute their judgment for
Nancy's judgment.4 8 Almost without discussion, the majority
opinion rejected that argument. There is no constitutionally
compelled requirement that a state recognize a family's right
to substitute its judgment where there is no clear and convincing evidence that their views reflect the views of the patient.4 9 The majority opinion summarily declined to extend
the protected and favored treatment of family relationships
recognized in Michael H. v. Gerald D."° and Parham v. J.R.5 1
to include a constitutionally protected right belonging to
Nancy Cruzan or to her family to act on her behalf in the
absence of an express proxy directive."
According to the majority opinion, because there can be no
"automatic assurance" that the views of the family members
will necessarily be the same as the patient's would have been,
the state may choose to defer only to the patient's express
wishes rather than repose the judgment with a spouse or other
family member.5" The Due Process Clause does not require
"the State to repose judgment on these matters with anyone
but the patient herself."54
In short, the Cruzan Court soundly, if summarily, rejected
constitutional protection for "patient-family rights"5 where
an individual leaves no express health-care proxy appointment. Cruzan implicates patient-family rights on two levels
select a family member as a surrogate, giving effect to a proxy's decisions may
also protect the "freedom of personal choice in matters of... family life."
Id. at 2858 (citation omitted).
48.
Id. at 2855-56.
49.
Id.
50.
491 U.S. 110, 130 (1989) (holding that each state may establish constitutionally favored treatment for traditional family relationships through its paternity laws).
51.
442 U.S. 584, 601-04 (1979) (upholding a state scheme in which parents
make certain decisions for mentally ill minors).
52.
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2855.
53.
Id. at 2856.
54.
Id. at 2855.
55.
"Patient-family rights" refers to the right of an incompetent individual to
have a family member or surrogate make a decision on her behalf, as well as the
independent right that a family member may have to act on behalf of the incompetent
patient.
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and suggests that neither level of patient-family rights is
constitutionally protected. First, even if he has left no
previous directive, there is the right of the individual himself
to have his own spouse or other family member step in and
make this judgment for him when he becomes incompetent.
Second, there is also the family's right to make that judgment
on the incompetent's behalf, much like the recognized right of
a parent to act on behalf of a minor. 6 For the incompetent
patient who has left no express proxy appointment, however,
these rights are not protected under Cruzan.
Although the Court's majority summarily rejected a generic
concept of patient-family rights when there is no previous
written directive, the concept of a generic set of "family rights"
was discussed vis-et-vis express proxy appointments. Justice
O'Connor noted in her concurring opinion that because
patients are likely to select a family member as a surrogate,
"giving effect to [the] proxy's decisions may also protect the
'freedom of personal choice in matters of ... family life.'""7
Thus, arguably, the concurring opinion would protect those
patient-family rights that are triggered by express proxy
appointments. An incompetent who has not had the foresight
or the opportunity to execute an express proxy appointment,
however, receives far less protection for her freedom of
personal choice in the matter of family life.
None of the majority or concurring opinions in Cruzan,
however, separately addressed an individual's right to have
his family act on his behalf (absent a proxy appointment), and
the distinct right of a family to substitute its judgment. The
majority did not distinguish between the two rights and
summarily rejected the family's "substituted judgment" argument,5" holding that a state could repose the decision-making

56.
See Faith E. Cuenin, Note, Life ProlongingTreatment Decisions for Defective
Newborns: Who Should Make the Choice?, 18 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 675, 683 (1984)
(noting that parents have a constitutional right to make certain decisions about their
children's education and religion); see also Jane Rutherford, Beyond Individual
Privacy: A New Theory of Family Rights, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 627, 652 (1987)
(proposing a new theory of "family rights" which belong to the family as a whole and
which include "vertical rights" that protect the family from government, and
"horizontal rights" that protect individuals within the family).
57.
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2858 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
58.
The "substituted judgment" standard refers to those decisions made by
proxies or members of the patient's family which essentially step into the shoes of the
incompetent patient in an attempt to make the judgment that the patient herself
would have made. See Developments in the Law-Medical Technology and the Law,
103 HARv. L. REV. 1519, 1646-51 (1990) (defining the substituted judgment standard
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authority solely in the patient. 59 The majority never identified or discussed independently an incompetent individual's
"right" to have a spouse or family member act on her behalf.
In light of national opinion polls and other statistical
surveys suggesting that a great majority of Americans would
choose to have their families make the decision in the event
of their incapacity,6 ° such cursory treatment of the issue by
the majority leaves serious "family rights" concerns," as
well as individual autonomy rights concerns, 2 inadequately
addressed.
Finally, Justice Stevens in his dissent objected strongly to
the majority's failure to extend a recognized constitutional

and surveying different courts' uses of it) [hereinafter Medical Technology and the
Law]; see also Philip G. Peters, Jr., The State's Interest in the Preservation of Life:
From Quinlan to Cruzan, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 891, 938-42 (1989) (advocating adoption
of the substituted judgment standard). But see Rebecca Dresser, RelitigatingLife and
Death, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 425, 427-34 (1990) (advocating adoption of the objective "best
interests test"); Nancy K. Rhoden, LitigatingLife and Death, 102 HARv. L. REV. 375,
376 (1988) (noting deficiencies in the substituted judgment standard).
59.
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2856.
60.
See infra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
61.
As in the case of a parent acting for a minor, such family rights should run
to family members acting on behalf of an incompetent patient who never executed an
advance health-care directive, as well as to the incompetent himself. Many decry the
erosion of the role of the family in this area:
[T]here has been an erosion of the role of the family in medical decision making.
Because of advanced age, because of emotional strains and family life, because
of the technological imperative that is a part of medicine, and because of the
fear of legal action on the part of providers and health-care institutions, the
family unit is no longer the source of decision making for incapacitated,
critically ill persons.
135 CONG. REC. S13,571 (daily ed., Oct. 17, 1989) (remarks on Federal Patient SelfDetermination Act by Father Dennis Brodeur, Senior Vice President-Stewardship at
the St. Mary's Health Care System, St. Louis, Missouri); see also Nancy Gibbs, Love
and Let Die, TIME,Mar. 19, 1990, at 62, 68 ("'The [Cruzan] decision severs family ties
... by substituting the moral and religious judgment of the state for that of the
person.'" (quoting an amicus brief filed in Cruzan by the Evangelical Lutheran
Church in America)). As one court stated:
Family members are best qualified to make substituted judgments for incompetent patients not only because of their peculiar grasp of the patient's approach to life, but also because of their special bonds with him or her .... It is
they.., who treat the patient as a person, rather than a symbol of a cause.
In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 445 (N.J. 1987); see also supra note 56.
62.
Similarly, there may be a separate right running to the individual which ensures that upon her incapacitation she may have her family act on her behalf even
without an express directive.
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right to refuse medical treatment to incompetent individuals
who had never executed an advance health-care directive."
Almost eerily anticipating the Christine Busalacchi case which
was to generate much national attention only six months
later,"4 he noted that for such incompetent persons, express
wishes as to their own treatment will be forever unknown
because of their failure or inability to execute clear and
convincing evidence of their own wishes for further medical
treatment decision making. 5 Justice Stevens decried what
he believed amounted to a "waiver rationale" in the majority's
opinion under which "the dying patient's best interests are put
to one side and the entire inquiry is focused on her prior
expressions of intent."6
Following Cruzan, therefore, a few generalizations may be
made as to the current status of right-to-die jurisprudence:
1.

2.

3.

4.

A constitutional right probably exists for a competent
person to refuse or withdraw medical treatment, and
"medical treatment" may include food and hydration. 7
The Cruzan opinions suggest, but do not hold, that a
person's protected liberty interest also requires that a
previously appointed proxy be recognized should the
patient become incompetent.68
Under certain circumstances, incompetents may have
surrogates make life-support decisions for them;
however, states are not constitutionally required to
effectuate a surrogate's decision to withhold treatment
absent clear and convincing evidence of the patient's
own intent regarding the withdrawal or withholding
of medical treatment expressly made while the patient
was previously competent.6 9
Cruzan renders suspect those existing state statutes
which do not recognize the validity of living wills, do

63.
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2881-83 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
64.
In re Busalacchi, No. 59582, 1991 Mo. App. LEXIS 315, 1991 WL 26851
(Mar. 5, 1991); see also Michael Tackett, Right-to-Die Case Faces Rehearing, CHI.
TRIB., Mar. 6, 1991, § 1, at 12 (describing the Busalacchi case).
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2881-83 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
65.
Id. at 2882.
66.
67.
See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
68.
See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
69.
See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
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not include artificial feeding and hydration within
"medical treatment" that may be withdrawn, and do
not recognize express health-care proxy appointments or durable power of attorney for health-care
decisions.7 °
There is no constitutionally protected right running to
the incompetent individual or, alternatively, to that
individual's family to have a spouse or other family
member substitute his or her judgment on behalf of
an incompetent who has left no previously expressed
evidence of his own intent regarding the withdrawal
or withholding of medical treatment.7 1
States are free to provide more protection than the
foregoing,
but are not constitutionally compelled to do
72
SO.

In sum, other than potentially protecting a competent
person's right to effectuate the terms of a living will (including
the removal of artificial feeding and hydration) or a healthcare proxy appointment, Cruzan's constitutional analysis does
little else to upset today's existing judicial and legislative
framework. Presumably, states are free to provide extra
protections if they choose to do so, but they are not constitutionally compelled to do so. As
such, protections are left to
73
"the 'laboratory' of the States."
B. A "Reverse Cruzan": In re Conservatorshipof Wanglie
Eight months following the Court's decision in Cruzan,
Helga Wanglie, an eighty-six year old woman,74 and her
family captured the attention of the nation with what was
really a reverse Cruzan case. Until July 1991, Helga Wanglie
lay in a persistent vegetative state in Hennepin County
Medical Center (HCMC) in Minneapolis, Minnesota.7 5 As in

70.
See infra notes 161-63 and accompanying text (discussing states' living-will
and proxy appointment statutes).
71.
See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
72.
See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
73.
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2859 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
74.
Brain-DamagedWoman at Center of Lawsuit over Life-Support Dies, N.Y.
TIMES, July 6, 1991, at A8 (late ed.).
75.
See In re Conservatorship of Wanglie, No. PX-91-283, (Minn. Dist. Ct.
June 28, 1991).
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Nancy Cruzan's case, there was no medical evidence to suggest
that Helga Wanglie's condition would improve. v6 Like Nancy
Cruzan's family, Helga Wanglie's family appeared to be in
agreement as to what Helga Wanglie would decide to do about
her respirator and feeding tubes if she were competent to
decide. Also similar to the Cruzans' situation, the Wanglie
family's wishes directly conflicted with the wishes of the
hospital and staff treating Helga Wanglie, and as a result, the
case ended up in court."v In a reverse of Cruzan, however,
Helga Wanglie's family did not want her life support system
to be removed. In this case, it was the hospital and its County
Board of Commissioners" who petitioned for the appointment
of a conservator 79 to make treatment decisions on Helga

76.
She was being kept alive by a respirator and artificial feeding through tubes.
She had severe brain damage, was unresponsive and had been tied to life support
systems at HCMC since early 1990. See Life in the Balance, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13,
1991, at E7.
77.
See generally Steinbrook, supra note 4, at A40-41.
78.
As a county hospital, HCMC is governed by elected county commissioners
who act as the Board of Trustees. In January 1990, the Board voted 4-3 to petition
a court to appoint a conservator for Helga Wanglie. See Lisa Belkin, As Family
Protests,HospitalSeeks an End to Woman's Life Support, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1991,
at Al, D22.
79.
Petition for Appointment of General Conservator, In re Conservatorship of
Wanglie, No. PX-91-283 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 28, 1991) (filed Feb. 7, 1991); see also
Tifft, supra note 4, at 67. Authorities at HCMC failed to persuade Mr. Wanglie to
transfer his wife to another health-care facility or, alternatively, to file for an
injunction forcing them to continue care for Mrs. Wanglie. Mr. Wanglie refused,
stating, "I want her to stay where she is,.... [a]nd I don't think I need a court order
to ask a hospital to provide medical care." See Belkin, supra note 78, at D22. The
hospital had the option of pursuing a declaratory judgment action or petitioning the
court to disqualify the family from taking part in Mrs. Wanglie's care and to appoint
a conservator who would decide whether the respirator and artificial feeding tubes
should be disconnected. The proposed conservator was Robert J. Sheran, retired
Chief Justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court. Petition for Appointment of General
Conservator at 4.
Because there was no possibility of recovery, HCMC officials asserted that despite
the family's insistence on using the respirator, it was not in Helga Wanglie's best
interests. See B.D. Colen, Fight over Life: Against Family Wishes, A Minnesota
Hospital May Go to Court in an Effort to End Measures Keeping a Woman Alive by
ArtificialMeans, NEWSDAY, Jan. 29, 1991, at 59,65; Steinbrook, supra note 4, at A41.
Additionally, they questioned whether the family's view reflected what the patient
would really want. See Steinbrook, supra note 4, at A41.
In a letter to the Wanglie family, which explained the hospital's position, HCMC
Director Michael Belzer wrote:
"We do not believe that we are obligated to provide care that cannot medically
advance the patient's personal interests. Though Ms. Wanglie has a right to
refuse any medical treatment, she does not have a right to oblige us to provide
care to her that is medically inappropriate to her condition."
Colen, supra, at 65.
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Wanglie's behalf, despite objections from Wanglie's family who
insisted that they were certain what Helga would do if she
were in fact competent to decide for herself.8 0
Billed as a "pure ethics case,"8 ' all of Mrs. Wanglie's
medical bills, estimated at between $800,000 and $1,000,000,
were paid by Medicare and private insurers.8 2 Thus, neither
the hospital nor the Wanglie family would bear the cost of
continued medical treatment.
The Wanglie and Cruzan cases are disturbing because in
each the court was asked to ignore the ostensibly clear and
express wishes of both the patient and her family, and to allow
the medical community to determine what was in her best
interest. Although HCMC petitioned for a conservator to be
appointed to determine independently Helga Wanglie's best
interest, it was motivated by a conflict which developed when
Wanglie's family refused to transfer Helga to a long-term care
facility, and refused to petition a court to compel HCMC to
continue medical treatment. The Center's Board of Trustees
voted 4-3 to petition the court for a legal resolution of the
issue, and filed the petition in probate court.8 3
Dr. Michael Belzer, director of HCMC, defined the legal
issue as whether a hospital staff may be compelled to render
medical treatment and provide care that cannot medically
advance the patient's personal interests,' or which it believes to be "medically inappropriate".8 5 When framed as a

80.
See supra note 4.
81.
At Odds with Family, Hospital Seeks to End Life, supra note 4, § 1, at 4.
82.
See Wagner, supra note 3, at 3.
83.
See Belkin, supra note 78, at D22. Commissioner Randy Johnson said, " ' As
a strictly legal question, it ... appears that no patient (or patient's family) has a
unilateral right to compel the medical staff of any hospital to administer a treatment
that the medical staff believes is futile and inappropriate.'" Case of Vegetative
Woman Headed to Court, UPI, Jan. 10, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Wires File (quoting Johnson's prepared statement).
84.
Telephone conversation with Dr. Michael Belzer, Director, HCMC (Jan. 26,
1991).
85.
See Colen, supra note 79, at 65. But Dr. Henry Silverman, a physician and
chairman of the Medical Ethics Committee at the University of Maryland Hospital,
disagrees:
Deciding that a patient is in a persistent vegetative state represents a medical judgment, whereas the judgment that a patient in a persistent vegetative
state should be allowed to die is a moral judgment and should not be recast as
a medical judgment based on a misguided appeal to a futility argument.
Henry Silverman, Will Society Defend Our Right to Live?: Medical v. Moral, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 31, 1991, at A22. Also very interesting is that pursuant to the passage
of the Illinois Health Care Surrogate Act, see infra notes 224-41 and accompanying
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purely medical issue, the hospital's argument is compelling.
The situation has been likened to one where a family of a
patient dying of cancer seeks to compel the treating physician
to provide antibiotics, or to perform an appendectomy-both of
which requests could be denied by the physician as futile and
not in the patient's best interests.8" Disturbing evidentiary
issues aside," Helga Wanglie's family insisted that when she
was still competent Helga had stated that she would not wish
her life support system to be withdrawn. 8 Consequently, her
family believed that they should not be required to get a court
order compelling treatment, or alternatively to transfer
Wanglie to another health-care facility that would continue to
treat her. 9
On June 28, 1991, a Minnesota County probate judge
rejected the hospital's petition and retained Helga Wanglie's
husband as her conservator.9" The judge ruled that decisions
of life and death should be left to competent family members,
and rejected the argument that Wanglie's husband was
incompetent to serve as her guardian.9 1 As her husband, he

text, the Illinois General Assembly expressly amended the proposed legislation to
exclude treatment considered "futile" from the definition of medical treatment that
could be withdrawn. Compare S. 1092, 87th Ill. G.A. § 10 (1991-92) (including
"futile" treatment within the definition of"[1]ife-sustaining treatment" that could be
withdrawn) with Health Care Surrogate Act, Pub. Act 87-749, § 10, 1991 Ill. Legis.
Serv. 3507, 3509 (West) (to be codified at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 851-10)
(excluding futile treatment from the definition).
86.
Dr. Stanley Reiser, Director of the Program on Humanities and Technology
in Health Care at the University of Texas Medical School in Houston, used the
analogy of a patient "who has cancer and whose family demands that he be given
antibiotics or have his appendix removed." At Odds with Family, HospitalSeeks to
End Life, supra note 4, § 1, at 4. According to Reiser, if that would not cure him, the
doctors would not follow his family's wishes. Similarly, if a cancer patient was being
treated with a drug that was not working, it would be stopped, despite family
objections. Id.
Exclusive reliance on previously expressed wishes can put tremendous
87.
pressure on friends and family members and can create evidentiary disputes. For
example, administrators at Wanglie's hospital stated that Wanglie's family never said
anything to them regarding Helga's expressed wishes or statements until after
hospital officials announced that they were taking the dispute to court. Steinbrook,
supra note 4, at A41. And in the second, postremand evidentiary hearing before
Judge Teel in Cruzan, three additional witnesses testified for the first time about
Nancy Cruzan's expressed wishes. The witnesses had been drawn out by the
publicity of the case. See supra note 36.
88.
See supra note 4.
See Belkin, supra note 78, at D22.
89.
90.
In re Conservatorship of Wanglie, No. PX-91-283, slip op. at [6] (Minn. Dist.
Ct. June 28, 1991).
91.
Id.

FALL 1991]

Paradoxand Pandora'sBox

was in the best position to determine his wife's interests.9 2
The hospital stated that it would not appeal,9 3 but its attorney correctly noted that although Wanglie's case is closed, the
issue of care for patients who have no hope of surviving awaits
a needed public policy solution.94 Because the issue in the
Wanglie case was cast in terms of the competence or incompetence of her legal guardian, the real legal issues surrounding
surrogate decision makers and death with dignity were never
fully briefed nor resolved. Three days after the judge ruled,
Mrs. Wanglie died of natural causes.9 5
Although factually the reverse of each other, both Cruzan
and Wanglie ultimately involve the same issue: Who should
decide what is in a patient's best interests when that patient
has left insufficient evidence of his own wishes about continued medical treatment? Cruzan suggests that a protected
liberty interest exists when a patient has left clear and
convincing evidence, thus requiring a state to effectuate those
wishes.9 6 But where an individual leaves no evidence of, or
insufficient evidence of, her own wishes, who is to decide?
Cruzan states clearly that nothing in the United States
Constitution compels a state to give the patient's family the
right to decide by substituting its judgment for the patient's,
even in the event of a conflict between the family and the
medical personnel. If the family has no right to decide, does
the medical staff therefore decide?9 7 Or should a court

92.
The "best interest" standard refers to a decision made by a patient's proxy
or family member on behalf of an incompetent patient in accordance with the
patient's best interest, and not exclusively on the basis of the substituted judgment
standard, discussed supra note 58. For a discussion of the best interests standard,
see Medical Technology and the Law, supra note 58, at 1651-53.
93.
See Wagner, supra note 3, at 3.
94.
Woman at Center of Right-to-Life Case Dies, UPI, July 5, 1991, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
95.
Id.
96.
110 S. Ct. at 2854-55.
97.
A recent survey reported that about one-third of doctors surveyed "believed
that their training and experience gave them greater authority than patients to make
decisions about withholding heroic treatment.'" Medical Technology and the Law,
supra note 58, at 1658 n.115 (quoting Kent W. Davidson, et al., Physicians'Attitudes
on Advance Directives, 262 JAMA 2415, 2419 (1989)).
The New Jersey Supreme Court, however, in In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976), reversed the lower court decision which had stated:
"It is a medical decision not a judicial one." Id. at 671 (quoting 348 A.2d 801, 819
(N.J. Super. Ct. 1975)). Even the medical community will differ as to specific cases.
See Gibbs, supra note 61, at 65 (noting that in their amicus briefs to the United
States Supreme Court in Cruzan, the American Academy of Neurology sharply differed with the Association of American Physicians and Surgeons regarding the
obligation of physicians to continue treatment of patients they cannot cure).
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determine what would be in a patient's best interest?9"
Should an insurance company or other third party be able to
petition? If no one is allowed to decide, is a patient destined
to linger for twenty or thirty years hooked up to machines providing medical treatment?
The paradox, of course, is that modern medical technology
can "provide artificial hearts or kidneys, but not artificial
judgment."9 9 Another observer has cast the paradox a little
differently, suggesting that "'you can't have a natural death
unless you do it the right way or fill out the right forms.
That's the perversity of it.'"'0 ° Finally, one physician has
noted the ethical difficulty of spending $800,000 on a persistent vegetative state patient while 37 million Americans go
uninsured or underinsured, and commented that in order to
obtain maximum health care in this country perhaps one must
fall into a persistent vegetative state. 10 1 For Helga Wanglie,
the paradox was not so academic. She failed to leave a
written advance health-care directive. Her family asserted
that she would wish to be sustained by medical treatment, yet
her medical care providers insisted that providing treatment
was futile and not in her personal interests. Her family
argued vociferously that she would wish to be sustained by
from a constitutional perspective Cruzan
any means, 102 yet fo
renders legally irrelevant their substituted judgment on her

behalf.13

C. The Case of Christine Busalacchi: Foreshadowed in
Stevens's Cruzan Dissent
Christine Busalacchi has lain in a persistent vegetative
state' 4 in the Missouri Rehabilitation Center (the same
See, e.g., In re Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115, 120 (Mass. 1980) (holding that the
98.
ultimate decision should lie with the court); Superintendent of Belchertown State
Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 431 (Mass. 1977) (same). But see Rhoden, supra
note 58 (arguing that nontreatment decisions made by courts are rarely justified by
the legal standards they actually articulate).
99.
136 CONG. REC. E943 (daily ed. Apr. 3, 1990) (remarks of Rep. Levin).
100. De Benedictis, supra note 36, at 27 (quoting attorney Giles Scofield).
Judge Denies Request to Cut Life Support, CHI. TRIB., July 2, 1991, § 1, at 3
101.
(final ed.).
102. See supra note 4.
103. See supra notes 48-59 and accompanying text.
104. Recently, the State contested whether Christine'Busalacchi is in a persistent
vegetative state. The State did not challenge her persistent vegetative state status
until Peter Busalacchi sought to have his daughter transferred to Minnesota. In re
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hospital in which Nancy Cruzan lay) for almost five years
after she was injured in a tragic automobile accident at the
age of seventeen. 105 Like Nancy Cruzan, Christine has been
sustained through artificial feeding and hydration through a
Also like Nancy Cruzan, Christine is
gastrostomy tube.'
not "dying." Christine's family has been told that Christine
could remain as she is for twenty or thirty years. 0 7
Unlike Nancy Cruzan, however, whose housemate' s and
co-workers' 0 9 testified regarding oral statements she made
to them as a competent adult before her automobile accident,
Christine Busalacchi was much younger when she had her
auto accident and entered into her persistent vegetative state.
Consequently, according to her father, Peter Busalacchi, she
never executed any written form of health-care directive nor
did she ever discuss what exactly she would wish to have
happen in the event she moved into a permanently unconscious state. 10 Even had she "discussed" the issue, because
Christine Busalacchi was a minor at the time of her accident,
courts would probably not find her competent to express
binding wishes about her future medical treatment."'
Christine Busalacchi thus represents exactly the type of case
eerily presaged by Justice Stevens in his Cruzan dissent,
issued only six months earlier:
The best interests of the incompetent individual who had
never confronted the issue-or perhaps had been incompetent since birth-are entirely irrelevant and unprotected
under the [Missouri Supreme Court's Cruzan opinion.]
... [Today's majority opinion] affords no protection to
children, to young people who are victims of unexpected

Busalacchi, No. 59582, 1991 Mo. App. LEXIS 315, at *11, 1991 WL 26851, at *4
(Mar. 5, 1991). Probate Judge Louis Kohn has since ruled that Christine is in a
persistent vegetative state. Father Backed in Right-to-Die Ruling, WASH. POST,
Dec. 1, 1991, § 1, at A15.
105. See Busalacchi, 1991 Mo. App. LEXIS 315, at *2, 1991 WL 26851, at *1.
106. See id.; see also supra text accompanying note 23.
107. Matchan, supra note 8, at 1.
108. Nancy Cruzan's housemate testified at her initial evidentiary hearing in
March 1988 before Judge Teel. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct.
2841, 2855 (1990).
109. Upon remand, three co-workers of Nancy's also testified. See Cruzan v.
Harmon, Estate No. CV384-9P, slip op. at 4 (Mo. Cir. Ct., P. Ct. Div. July 28, 1988);
De Benedictis, supra note 36, at 26.
110. See Another Right-to-DieCasePoses New Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1991,
at A12.
111. See In re Busalacchi, No. 59582, 1991 Mo. App. LEXIS 315, at *14, 1991 WL
26851, at *4 (Mar. 5, 1991).
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accidents or illnesses, or to the countless thousands of
elderly persons who either fail to decide, or fail to explain,
how they want to be treated ....
Christine Busalacchi's father wants to transfer Christine
from the Missouri Rehabilitation Center in Missouri to Minnesota so that she can be examined by Dr. Ronald Cranford, a
neurologist at HCMC in Minneapolis." 3
Minnesota law
gives physicians and family members more leeway in deciding
to remove
treatment from patients than does Missouri
1 4
law. 1
Recently, a Missouri appellate court ruled that more
evidence of what was in Christine Busalacchi's best interests
was needed before she could be transferred from Missouri for
medical evaluation in Minnesota." 5 The Missouri Supreme
Court has decided to hear the appeal after the evidentiary
hearing." 6 Thus, Peter Busalacchi is temporarily prohibited
from moving his daughter to Minnesota. The appellate court
did not hold, however, that Peter Busalacchi had any specific
intent to transfer his daughter for the sole purpose of terminating her life support in Minnesota." 7 Instead, the court
cast the issue as one of guardianship, and not the right to
die." ' It noted that there is now disagreement as to whether
Christine is actually in a persistent vegetative state, and that

112. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2881-83 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
113. See Right to Die Ruling, NEWSDAY, Jan. 18, 1991, at 12. Although Dr.
Cranford works at HCMC, should Christine Busalacchi arrive in Minneapolis, she
would actually be examined by Cranford at St. Mary's Rehabilitation Center in
Minneapolis. See Another Right to Die Case Poses New Questions, supra note 110, at
A12.
114. In Minnesota, a probate court may empower a conservator to terminate lifesupport systems if such systems are no longer in the patient's best interests. See In
re Conservatorship of Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 338-39 (Minn. 1984).
115. In re Busalacchi, No. 59582, 1991 Mo. App. LEXIS 315, 1991 WL 26851
(Mar. 5, 1991), reversing No. 93799 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Jan. 16, 1991).
116. See Order, In re Busalacchi, No. 73677, 1991 Mo. LEXIS 107 (Oct. 16, 1991).
The trial court has since completed its hearing, thus paving the way for a decision
from the Missouri Supreme Court. See FatherBacked in Right-to-Die Ruling, supra
note 104.
117. Busalacchi, 1991 Mo. App. LEXIS 315, at *15-17, 1991 WL 26851, at *5-6
(instructing the trial court to reconsider the evidence relevant to the guardian's
burden of showing a reasonable need to move the patient, including the guardian's
motivation for the move). As noted in Judge Gerald Smith's dissenting opinion, the
lower court found that Busalacchi's primary intent in making the move was not to
disconnect the life support. Id. at *27, 1991 WL 26851, at *9 (Smith, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at *13, *16, 1991 WL 26851, at *4-5.
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Busalacchi seeks a transfer in order to have her evaluated,
with the possibility that at a later date he may choose to have
the life support removed.11 9
Somewhat incongruously, although the appellate court
declined to find that Peter Busalacchi had any predetermined
intent to withhold or withdraw life-prolonging treatment, it
also stated: "Specifically, we will not permit [a] guardian to
forum shop in an effort to control whether Christine lives or
dies." 2 °
The appellate court's underlying premise thus
seems clear:
Busalacchi must show that Christine was
receiving insufficient care in Missouri before she can be
moved. As such, the court's ruling appears to be based upon
some parochial notion that harm-and not proper medical
evaluation and treatment-would
befall her if she were
21
allowed to transfer.'
As the father and guardian of a brain-damaged woman kept
alive by a feeding tube, Peter Busalacchi feels that it is his
right, and not the state's, to decide whether he can move his
daughter to a state with a more lenient death-with-dignity
law.'2 2 As discussed, Cruzan dictates that because she is in
Missouri and because there is no clear and convincing evidence of Christine's expressed intent, Christine Busalacchi has
no constitutional right to have a guardian decide to withdraw
treatment. 2
Moreover, because she was a minor at the
time of her accident, it is doubtful that Christine could ever
have expressed the requisite intent. 124 Notwithstanding all
of the foregoing, under Cruzan Missouri is not required to
substitute Peter Busalacchi's judgment on behalf of his
daughter.
In addition to the question of patient-family rights, i.e.,
Peter Busalacchi's rights and Christine's right to have her
father decide on her behalf, substantial questions arise when
the exercise of such fundamental rights varies from state to
state. Unlike competent persons, most incompetent persons
have no constitutionally protected right to die. From a

119. Id. at *12, 1991 WL 26851, at *4.
120. Id. at *17, 1991 WL 26851, at *5.
121. As Judge Smith wrote in dissent: "Minnesota is not a medical or ethical
wasteland.... There is a parochial arrogance in suggesting, as the State does, that
only in Missouri can Christine's medical, physical and legal well being be protected
." Id. at *29, 1991 WL 26851, at *10 (Smith, J., dissenting).
122. Brain Death Struggle, NEWSDAY, Jan. 20, 1991, at 12.
123. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
124. See Busalacchi, 1991 Mo. App. LEXIS 315, at *14, 1991 WL 26851, at *4.
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constitutional perspective, they are forever precluded from
exercising what Cruzan presumed was a protected liberty
interest. Moreover, incompetent persons-as a class-receive
substantially different treatment in the exercise of these
protected rights depending solely upon the state in which they
are located. Finally, at least one state (Missouri) has denied
an incompetent's petition to transfer out of that state in order
to seek legal remedies elsewhere. On one level, this disparity
may interfere with citizens' rights to be free from irrational
and arbitrary legislation. On another level, it triggers equal
protection problems.
Cruzan presumes that a protected right to die exists for
competent persons who have previously left clear and convincing evidence of their wishes. Thus, competent persons in fifty
states are afforded this constitutional protection if they meet
the threshold evidentiary requirement. Specifically, however,
as a minor and an incompetent, Christine Busalacchi is
forever precluded from exercising that same constitutionally
protected right, and her family has no right to effectuate a
decision on her behalf.
If the Court has elevated this right to some level of protection, then it is also disturbing that Christine-even as an
incompetent-does not have the same level of protection in
Missouri that she would have in Minnesota, and the appellate
court has temporarily prohibited her from transferring
there.' 25
In Cruzan, the United States Supreme Court
dismissed in a footnote an equal protection claim raised by
the Cruzans.' 2 6 However, that discussion was cursory and
only dealt with disparate treatment received by incompetents
vis-&-vis competent patients. The Court did not discuss any
equal protection problems that result from disparate treatment of incompetents in one state vis-t-vis incompetents in
another state. 27 Thus, under current law, in Missouri,
Christine Busalacchi will likely remain on life support for the
indeterminate future, and neither she nor her family has any
say in the matter, whereas in Minnesota, her wishes or her
family's wishes to terminate life support would be respected.
An analysis of the Busalacchi case within the framework of
the majority opinion in Cruzan suggests that (questions

125. See id. at *18, 1991 Mo. App. LEXIS 315, at *18, 1991 WL 26851, at *6
(Stephan, J., concurring) (supporting a permanent injunction of Christine's travel
until her guardian's decision to move her is in her best interests).
126. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2856 n.12 (1990).
127. See id.
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regarding her minority status aside) prior to her automobile
accident, Christine Busalacchi should have either signed a
living will or proxy directive, or contemplated her own death
sufficiently to formally articulate her wishes to her father or
some other party with sufficient specificity, clarity and detail
to meet Missouri's "clear and convincing" evidentiary standard. Both of these options are obviously unrealistic. Yet her
failure to have done either of these things by the time of her
accident means that Christine Busalacchi may remain an
unconscious patient in the Missouri Rehabilitation Center,
suspended somewhere between life and death' 8 for the next
twenty to thirty years or longer. Her father is prohibited from
acting on her behalf because there is no clear and convincing
evidence of her intent, and even if there were, her minority
status at the time of the accident would render her wishes
unenforceable. He is also temporarily prohibited from moving
her out of Missouri and to another state.
From a constitutional perspective, the right to die is
protected only for those few competent patients who leave
behind clear and convincing evidence of their wishes. The
vast majority of persons, however, fail to create clear and
convincing evidence of their own wishes, or are incompetent to
do so, and the laboratories of the states deal with these
individuals and their families in a myriad of confusing and
conflicting ways.

D. National Statistics

Christine Busalacchi's situation is not unique. There are an
estimated 10,000 to 25,000 patients today in the United States
who are diagnosed as persistent vegetative state patients. 2 9

128. The Arizona Supreme Court has described this place as a "twilight zone."
Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 678 (Ariz. 1987) (en banc) ("Medical technology
has effectively created a twilight zone of suspended animation where death
commences while life, in some form, continues."); see also Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2863
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Rasmussen); Goodman, supra note 8, at 15 (using the
term "high-tech 'twilight zone'").
129. See Gibbs, supra note 61, at 62 (10,000); Council Report, supra note 22, at
427 (25,000); see also Robyn S. Shapiro, The Case of L.W.: An Argument for a
Permanent Vegetative State Treatment Statute, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 439, 439 (1990)
(citing Council Report). For a description of persistent vegetative state, see supra
note 22.
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Those numbers will likely increase as medical technology
improves. Another 1.5 million have severe dementia, and an
estimated 4 million Americans have some form of Alzheimer's
disease. 3 ° The American Medical Association recently estimated that 10,000 Americans "fall into irreversible comas each
year and that approximately 70% of all Americans will face a
decision to refuse life-sustaining treatment for themselves or
a family member at some point in their lives." 3 '
The demographics of dying in America are changing also.
As America ages, more citizens are entering nursing
homes. 3 2 Further, they are dying in hospitals and nursing
homes and not at home as in the past. 133 In 1939, only 37%
of the population died in institutions. Now between 80% and
85% die in institutions. 3 4 About 70% of these deaths in
nursing homes and hospitals involve some decision to apply,
35
withhold, or withdraw medical treatment or technology,
and involve scenarios in which patients are "likely to meet
their end. .. 'in a sedated or comatose state; betubed nasally,
abdominally and intravenously.' "136 This situation is far
different from death as envisioned and experienced by the
framers of the United States Constitution 200 years ago.
Not surprisingly, as the place of death changes and the
medical technology of life and death changes, Americans are
increasingly and overwhelmingly clear about their beliefs that
they do not wish to end up in a position like Nancy Cruzan or

130. Clarence Page, Modern Medicine and 'Living Dead'-Another Tough Case,
CHI. TRIB., Jan. 3, 1990, § 1, at 11.
131. Edward A. Lyon, Note, The Right to Die: An Exercise of Informed Consent,
Not an Extension of the ConstitutionalRight to Privacy,58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1367, 1372
(1990).
132. The number of people in U.S. nursing homes nearly tripled between 1964 and
1985. Nursing Homes PlayingLargerRoles, Survey Finds, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 28, 1991,
§ 1, at 17. One study projects that "of2.2 million Americans who turned 65 last year,
more than 900,000 of them, or 43%, are expected to enter a nursing home at least
once before they die." Id.
133. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2883 (1990)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
134. 136 CONG. REC. E943 (daily ed. Apr. 3, 1990) (statement of Rep. Levin); see
also Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2882-83 (Stevens, J., dissenting). A President's
Commission Report estimates that 80% of all deaths in the United States occur in
hospitals and long-term care institutions. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF
ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH,
DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 17-18 (1983).

135.
See Belkin, supra note 78, at Al.
136. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2878 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Anne Fadiman,
The Liberation of Lolly and Gronky, LIFE, Dec. 1986, at 70, 72 (quoting medical
ethicist Joseph Fletcher)).
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Christine Busalacchi. Most people, estimated at between
75%137 and 85%,138 say they would not want to have their
own lives maintained with artificial nutrition and hydration
if they became permanently unconscious.
Other studies suggest that Americans are equally clear
about who should make the decision in the event an individual
patient becomes incompetent. According to public opinion
polls shortly after the Cruzan decision, 95% would like to
leave their own specific instructions regarding life support
should they become incompetent. 139 And two studies suggest
that between 80%140 and 88%1 4 ' believe that when there
are no expressed instructions "it should be up to the family to
decide whether to end artificial life supports when an individual is in a coma with no hope of recovery. " 142 Beyond that,
one poll reports that only 8% of Americans believe that doctors
should make the decision on behalf of the patient, 1% believe
the court should decide, and 0% believe that the state should
make the determination. 143 The Vatican 144 and other religious organizations 145 echo this national consensus. The

137. Medical Technology and the Law, supra note 58, at 1647 n.35.
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2869 n.l1 (1990)
138.
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
139. See 136 CONG. REC. S9517 (daily ed. July 11, 1990) (remarks of Sen. Danforth).
Gibbs, supra note 61, at 64 (citing a Time/CNN poll by Yankelovich Clancy
140.
Schulman which found that 80% of Americans would prefer that such decisions were
made by their families and doctors rather than lawmakers).
141.
Matchan, supra note 8, at 10.
142. Id. This trend coincides with increasing scholarly support for family discretion in decision making for incapacitated patients. See, e.g., Rhoden, supra note
58, at 437; Daniel Gindes, Case Comment, Judicial Postponement of Death
Recognition: The Tragic Case of Mary O'Connor, 15 AM. J.L. & MED. 301 (1989); see
also Steven M. Richard, Note, Someone Make Up My Mind: The Troubling Right to
Die Issues Presentedby Incompetent Patientswith No PriorExpression of a Treatment
Preference, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 394, 413-20 (1989) (arguing that a patient's
family and attending physicians should make treatment decisions).
Matchan, supra note 8, at 10.
143.
Gibbs, supra note 61, at 67 (reporting that in 1989, the Vatican said refusing
144.
treatment is not the equivalent of suicide); see also 135 CONG. REC. S13,570 (daily ed.
Oct. 17, 1989) (remarks of Father Dennis Brodeur) (supporting a patient's decision
to withdraw medical treatment). But note that one Roman Catholic Church group
successfully lobbied the New York legislature to enact special requirements for
withholding artificial feeding and hydration. Elisabeth Rosenthal, Filling the Gap
Where a Living Will Won't Do, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1991, at B9. This is representative of a national split among Roman Catholic groups on the issue of artificial feeding
and hydration. Joseph P. Shapiro, A Vote on Legal Euthanasia,U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Sept. 30, 1991, at 32, 34.
See 135 CONG. REC. S13,571 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1989) (remarks of Rabbi Rav.
145.
A. Soloff); see also American Jewish Congress Says 'PatientSelf-DeterminationAct'
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medical community also increasingly accepts the idea of nontreatment, as evidenced in 1986 by the American Medical
Association's statement that "it is ethical for physicians to
discontinue life-prolonging treatment, including medical
nutrition and hydration, from terminally ill and irreversibly
comatose patients." 4 6
In short, recent polls and studies indicate that most Americans do not wish to prolong their own lives with artificial
means of support when they are irretrievably comatose or
terminally ill. Moreover, they exhibit a strong preference to
have a family member make the decision for them in the event
they cannot, or their wishes are unclear. Finally, the great
majority of Americans will in fact be faced with this situation,
as four out of five will actually die in hospitals and nursing
homes, and about 70% of those deaths will involve some type
of decision to continue or to withhold life support.
Shockingly, despite a clear national will to effectuate
individual wishes, surveys show that only a very small
minority of Americans, estimated at between 9%147 and
20%,14 have actually executed living wills or other advance
directives. That low number may be on the rise as a direct
result of the Cruzan decision and the publicity it has generated.' 4 9 If so, it is consistent with the emerging national
consensus of Americans wishing to direct their own deaths
with dignity by leaving express directives as to health-care
decision making in the event of their own incompetency.
Presumably, as this "information vacuum" is filled, more
individuals will create advance directives.
There is also, however, quite an information vacuum at the
treatment site. Although between 75% and 80% of Americans
now die in institutions, only 4% of hospitals ask patients upon

Advances Free Exercise of Religion, PR Newswire, Aug. 10, 1990, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Wires File.
146. Dresser, supra note 58, at 436 (citing AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS'N, CURRENT
OPINION OF THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS 12-13 (1986)).
147. See 136 CONG. REC. S9517 (daily ed. July 11, 1990) (remarks of Sen. Danforth);
135 CONG. REC. S13,573 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1989) (remarks of Myra J. Christopher).
148.
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2875 n.21 (1990)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
149.
Since the Cruzan ruling, right-to-die advocates have distributed between
500,000 and 750,000 living will forms on which patients can state their desires about
life-sustaining treatment. See The Next Cruzan Case, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Jan. 14, 1991, at 8; De Benedictis, supra note 36, at 26.
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admission whether they have executed an advance directive.'
A high number of physicians have never heard of or
are unfamiliar with their state's provisions on living wills' 5 '
or durable power of attorney for health care.'5 2 Incredibly,
there are also surveys which show that many physicians
simply do not honor living-will directives unless they agree
with the directive or unless the patient actually reaffirmed her
living will during her hospitalization.'5 3
Physicians also
express very legitimate concern over the usefulness or
accuracy of advance directives,'5 4 which are often vague,
outdated, or too general to be of use to the physician.' 5 5
Given the information vacuum at both the patient level and
the treatment site, the opportunity for erroneous decision
making seems enormous. Moreover, the attendant costs for
unenforced wishes to terminate treatment can be enormous.
Cost estimates for the care of patients in persistent vegetative
states are staggering: Christine Busalacchi's treatment alone
costs $125,000 per year 5 ' and a nationwide estimate, based

150. See 136 CONG. REC. S9517 (daily ed. July 11, 1990) (remarks of Sen.
Danforth). The new Federal Patient Self-Determination Act is designed to correct
this. See infra notes 194-200 and accompanying text.
151. See Medical Technology and the Law, supra note 58, at 1659 n.122 (reporting
that 85% of California physicians surveyed either had never heard of, or knew no
details about, the state's living-will statute).
152. See 136 CONG. REC. E944 (statement of Rep. Levin) (citing a study which
found that in Colorado, 23% of the physicians surveyed were unfamiliar with living
wills and 74% were unfamiliar with durable power of attorney provisions, and in
Arkansas, 38.4% were unfamiliar with state law on advance health-care directives).
153. See Thomas Mayo, Constitutionalizingthe 'Right to Die, 49 MD. L. REV. 103,
147 & nn.233, 234 (1990).
154. See, e.g., Linda L. Emanuel & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, The Medical Directive:
A New Comprehensive Advance Care Document, 261 JAMA 3288, 3289 (1989).
155. De Benedictis, supra note 36, at 27 (describing living wills as too abstract
and too ambiguous because they require an individual to anticipate types of
treatment); Goodman, supra note 8, at 15 (exploring the practical problems of having
to leave "behind a full record of your attitudes about the major bioethics questions
of the day" in order to provide "clear and convincing evidence" of your own wishes);
Shari Roan, Last Wishes, L.A. TIMES, July 17, 1990, at El, E4; Rosenthal, supra note
144, at 9 (stating that the major flaw with living wills is that they are too general
and are subject to interpretation). Precisely because many living-will directives are
vague and unenforceable, two doctors have developed a new proposed detailed
"Medical Directive" which is "treatment specific" and is designed to give physicians
and hospital administration much more comprehensive information regarding exactly
what a patient's wishes are vis-&-vis different types of incapacity. A patient checks
48 boxes specifying exactly what types of treatment she wants under specific
circumstances. The "Medical Directive" is thus designed to give better information
and will be more enforceable than existing directives. Emanuel & Emanuel, supra
note 154, at 3290.
156. Matchan, supra note 8, at 10.
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on a total number of 5000-10,000 persistent vegetative state

patients in the United States, reaches $120 million to $1.2
billion annually. 157 Those staggering figures do not even
include the high costs of the first year of medical care after the
original injury when the patient generally spends a great deal
5 ' The total figure
of time in a hospital's intensive care unit."
climbs to $3 billion annually if one uses the high-end figure of
59
25,000 persistent vegetative state patients nationwide.
The potential waste-in human life as well as valuable healthcare dollars-is inexcusable for those persistent vegetative
state patients whose wishes to terminate treatment might
otherwise have been ascertained accurately and efficiently
prior to their illnesses with a nationally coordinated preventative program.
In short, the emerging national consensus 6 ° must be used
to persuade legislatures in "the state laboratories" to do two
things. First, states must recognize the importance of prevention and uniformity. They must streamline and make uniform
a system of advance health-care directives in order to effect an
emerging national consensus that Americans want to make
their own decisions as to withdrawal of their own life support.
We must create uniformity among the states to increase
fairness and decrease forum shopping. It is also essential to
prevent wherever possible Cruzan-like tragedies by obtaining
the best evidence possible of each patient's wishes, before a
crisis arises, by increasing the number of adults making
advance health-care directives as well as increasing the
enforceability and reliability of those directives. By making
prevention and uniformity our new national objectives, we can
reduce the national cost in human and financial resources
where such costs could clearly be prevented.
Second, the states must extend more comprehensive
protection by recognizing the existence of patient-family
rights. They must acknowledge that a clear national consensus is emerging that people do not wish to end their lives like
Nancy Cruzan or Christine Busalacchi and that their families
157.
Shapiro, supra note 129, at 443.
158. Id.
159. For estimates of the number of persistent vegetative state patients, see supra
note 129.
160. But see Stuart J. Youngner, Who Defines Futility?, 260 JAMA 2094, 2095
(1988) (suggesting that there is not yet any national consensus on this issue).
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are the best decision makers when they have not previously
executed an express directive.

II.

LEGISLATIVE DISARnqAY REQUIRES NEW INITIATIVES

A. Existing State Legislative Responses

The personal and public tragedies of Nancy Cruzan, Helga
Wanglie, and Christine Busalacchi could have been prevented.
Throughout the nation, most state legislatures simply have
not responded effectively to the enormity of the problem and
the enormity of the personal and public costs. Because
America is aging and medical technology is improving, this
problem clearly will not go away. Moreover, the country
spends enormous amounts of money at the back-end of the
problem. The current state legislative and judicial responses
to the issue promote confusion, inequity, and disarray, as seen,
for example, in Peter Busalacchi's frustrated attempts to
transfer his daughter from Missouri to Minnesota. Deference
to "the state laboratories" as directed by Cruzan, however,
should not mean that the current patchwork response to the
problem is effective or even warranted. It is time to recognize
the need for uniformity and the national plea for assistance.
Currently, forty-three states and the District of Columbia
have some type of living-will legislation.' 6 ' Additionally, all

161. See ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (1990); ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.12.010-.100
(1991); ARIZ. REV: STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 to -3211 (1986 & Supp. 1991); ARK. CODE
ANN. §§ 20-17-201 to -218 (Michie Supp. 1991); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 7185-7195 (Deering Supp. 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-18-101 to -113 (1987 &
Supp. 1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19A-570 to -575 (West Supp. 1990); D.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421 to -2430 (1989); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2508 (1983);
FLA. STAT. ch. 765.01-.17 (1989 & Supp. 1990); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-1 to -12 (Michie
1991); HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 327D-1 to -27 (Supp. 1990); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to -4509
(1985 & Supp. 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, paras. 701-710 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1991); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-8-11-1 to -22 (West Supp. 1991); IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 144A.1-.11 (West 1989); KAN.STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28,101 to -28,109 (1985); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 311.622-.644 (MichielBobbs-Merrill Supp. 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 40:1299.58.1-.10 (West Supp. 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §§ 5-701 to -714
(West Supp. 1991); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 5-601 to -614 (1990); MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 145B.01-.17 (West Supp. 1992); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101 to -121 (Supp.
1991); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 459.010-.055 (1986); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-101 to -206
(1991); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 449.540-.690 (1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-H:1-:15
(Supp. 1991); New Jersey Advance Directives for Health Care Act, ch. 201, 1991 N.J.
Sess. Law Serv. 800 (West) (to be codified principally at N.J. STAT. ANN §§ 26:2H-53
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fifty states and the District of Columbia have durable power
of attorney statutes, which provide for express proxy appointments for general decision-making authority after an individual is disabled. 162 Finally, forty states have either durable
power of attorney statutes which (more specifically) expressly
provide for health-care decisions, or, alternatively, health-care
proxy statutes which are included in the living-will legislation. 163 Both of these types of advance directives have been

to -78); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to -10 (Michie 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320
to -323 (1990 & Supp. 1991); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-06.4-01 to -14 (1991); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 63, §§ 3101-3111 (Supp. 1990); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.605-.650 (1989);
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-66-10 to -80 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. §§ 34-12D-1 to -22 (Supp. 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-11-101 to -112 (Supp.
1991); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 672.001-021 (West Supp. 1991); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 to -1118 (Supp. 1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5251-5262
(1987); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2981 to -2992 (Michie 1991); WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 70.122.010-.905 (1989); W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30-1 to -13 (1991 & Supp. 1991); WIS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01-.15 (West 1989); WYO. STAT. §§ 35-22-101 to -109 (1988 &
Supp. 1991).
162.
See ALA. CODE § 26-1-2 (1986); ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.26.350 (Supp. 1991); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5501 (1975); ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-68-202 (Michie 1987); CAL.
CIV. CODE § 2401 (Deering 1986); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-14-501 (Supp. 1991); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-562 (West Supp. 1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 4902 (1987);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2082 (1989); FLA. STAT. § 709.08 (Supp. 1990); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 10-6-36 (Michie 1989); HAW. REV. STAT. § 551D-2 (Supp. 1990); IDAHO CODE § 15-5-502
(Supp. 1991); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 802-6 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); IND.
CODE ANN. § 30-5-10-3 (West Supp. 1991); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.705 (Supp. 1991);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-610 (1983); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 386.093 (Michie/BobbsMerrill 1984); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3027(B) (West Supp. 1991); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-501 (West Supp. 1991); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 13-601
(1991); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 201, § 2 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991); MICH. COMp. LAWS
ANN. § 700.495 (1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 523.07 (West 1990); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 87-3-13 (1991); Mo. REV. STAT. § 404.705 (Supp. 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-5-501
(1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2666 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. § 111.460 (1989); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 506:6 (Supp. 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:2B-8 (West 1989); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 45-5-501 (Michie 1989); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1601 (McKinney
1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-9 (1991); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-30-02 (Supp. 1991);
Oio REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.09 (Baldwin Supp. 1990); OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 1073
(Supp. 1990); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.005 (1989); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5604 (Supp.
1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-22-6.1 (1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-5-501 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 59-7-2.1 (Supp. 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-6-103
(1991); TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 36A (West Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-5-501
(1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3051 (1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 11-9.1 (Michie 1989);
WASH. REV. CODE § 11.94.010 (1989); W. VA. CODE § 39-4-2 (Supp. 1991); WiS. STAT.
ANN. § 243.07(2) (West 1987); WYO. STAT. § 3-5-101 (Supp. 1991).
163. As of this writing, 30 states have separate statutory provisions for durable
power of attorney for health care. See ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.335 (Supp. 1990); CAL.
CIV. CODE §§ 2430-2444 (Deering Supp. 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-14-501 (Supp.
1991); FLA. STAT. § 79.08 (Supp. 1990); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-36-1 to -13 (Michie
1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, paras. 804-1 to -12 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 16-8-12-6, 30-5-5-16 to -17 (West Supp. 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-625
to -632 (Supp. 1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-501 (West Supp. 1991);
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analyzed and discussed extensively." 4 Current commentary
favors the proxy appointment directive, as the living-will
provisions have many limitations." 5
B. Problems with State Legislative Treatment
of Living Wills
The Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act 66 (URTIA),
promulgated in 1985,17 forms the basis for many of the
individual states' living-will statutes. Generally, the Act
MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 201D, §§ 1-17 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 700.496 (West Supp. 1991); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-151 to -183 (Supp.
1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 404.800-.870 (Vernon Supp. 1992); NEV. REV. STAT.
§§ 449.800-.860 (1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-501 (Michie 1989); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW §§ 2980-2994 (McKinney Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 32A-15 to -26 (1991);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.5 (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1337.11-.17 (Baldwin
Supp. 1990); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.505-.585 (1989); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 5603(h) (Supp. 1991); R.I. GEN. LAwS §§ 23-4.10-1 to .10-2 (1989); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 62-5-501 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. §§ 59-7-2.1 to -2.5
(Supp. 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 34-6-201 to -215 (1991); TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REMEDIES CODE §§ 135.001-.018 (West Supp: 1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,
§§ 3451-3467 (1989 & Supp. 1991); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.94.010(3) (1989); Wis.
STAT. ANN. §§ 155.01-.80 (West Supp. 1991); WYO. STAT. § 3-5-201 to -213 (Supp.
1991). Twelve states authorize the appointment of health-care proxies as part of
their living-will statutes. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-17-201 to -202 (Michie Supp.
1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2502 (1983); FLA. STAT. § 765.05(2) (1989 & Supp.
1990); IDAHO CODE § 39-4505 (Supp. 1991); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.7 (West 1989);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.3 (West Supp. 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145B.03
(West Supp. 1992); New Jersey Advance Directives for Health Care Act, ch. 201, § 6,
1991 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 800, 803-04 (West) (to be codified at N.J. STAT. ANN
§ 26:2H-58); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 672.003(d) (West 1991); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 75-2-1105 (Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2984 (Michie 1991); WYO. STAT.
§ 35-22-102 (Supp. 1991). Note that Texas and Wyoming have both types of
provisions.
164. See, e.g., Chapman, supra note 14, at 320 & nn.2, 4; Dresser, supra note 58,
at 431-34; Rhoden, supra note 58; Christopher J. Condie, Comment, Comparison of
the Living Will Statutes of the Fifty States, 14 J. CONTEMP. L. 105 (1988); Melinda M.
Organ, Comment, Withholding Life-Sustaining Treatment from the Incompetent
Patient: The Need for Statutory Guidelines, 17 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 427 (1986).
Judicial treatment of the issue has also been thoroughly and extensively discussed.
For an exhaustive discussion of case law treatment of the issue, see Peters, supra
note 58; see also Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2888 n.21 (1990)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (providing an extensive compilation of judicial treatment of
this issue).
165. See, e.g., Condie, supra note 164, at 111; Karen M. Moran, Note, The Conflict
Continues: Who Decides Treatment Questions for the Terminally-Ill Incompetent
Patient?, 18 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 641, 673 (1984).
166. 9B U.L.A. 609 (1987).
167. Id. historical note, 9B U.L.A. 609.
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provides that a competent adult may execute in writing
health-care directives which would apply should he later
a
become terminally ill, incompetent, and required to make
68
medical decision about whether to terminate life support.
The problems with the various states' living-will provisions,
however, are legion. First and foremost, they do not reach the
majority of Americans who have not yet executed formal living
wills. The URTIA living-will provisions and similar statutes
only apply to those individuals who have prepared formal
living wills prior to their subsequent incompetence, which is
estimated to be only 9-20% of Americans. 169 That means
80-91% of Americans are virtually unprotected by living-will
legislation.
Executing a living will, however, will not solve every
situation. Living-will statutes apply only to adults and
previously competent individuals, 7 ° and they generally
apply only to "terminally ill" patients for whom death is
"imminent,"' 7 ' and thus, by definition, do not reach persistent vegetative state patients like Cruzan, Busalacchi, and
Wanglie. Further, state statutes often expressly exclude
artificial provision of food and hydration from the definition of
medical treatment which may be withdrawn"' even if such
wishes are clearly and convincingly expressed.' 7 3 Cruzan,
Busalacchi, and Wanglie all received medical treatment by
forced tube feeding and hydration and thus also would not be
covered by this provision.

168. Id. prefatory note, 9B U.L.A. 609 (explaining the general purpose of the Act).
169.
See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text. Presumably in recognition
of this problem, URTIA was amended in 1989 to protect individuals who did not leave
living wills. URTIA (1989 act) § 7, 9B U.L.A. 90 (Supp. 1991). This language has
been adopted-in widely varying degrees-by very few states. See infra note 210 and
accompanying text.
170. URTIA § 2(a), 9B U.L.A. 614.
171.
Id. § 1(7), 9B U.L.A. 611.
172. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-206(b) (Michie Supp. 1991) ("This
subchapter does not affect the responsibility of the attending physician or other
health-care provider to provide treatment, including nutrition and hydration, for a
patient's comfort, care, or alleviation of pain."); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-11-4 (West
Supp. 1991); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.2(b) (1989); Mo. REV. STAT. § 459.010(3) (1986);
see also Joel M. Zinberg, Decisions for the Dying: An Empirical Study of Physicians'
Responses to Advance Directives, 13 VT. L. REV. 445, 458-59 (1989) (noting that 20
states specifically omit artificial food and hydration); Mayo, supra note 153, at 136,
139 n.198.
173. Cruzan renders these provisions constitutionally suspect. See supra notes
30-47 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, state living-will statutes often apply only to the
citizens of that state; only twelve states recognize living wills
executed in another state,' 74 sometimes additionally requiring
that the other state's requirements be substantially similar to
their own.' 75 These statutes also lack enforcement bite, as
many physicians do not even ask patients if they have a living
will,17 do not know their own state's laws as to living
wills, 177 and will not follow the patient's living-will direc78
tives, even when the physician is made aware of them.
Even were physicians aware of living wills, many states make
them advisory only and not binding;7 9 and many living wills
are so poorly drafted and vague as to be poor indications of a
patient's true intent. 8 0
States also vary as to how frequently their living wills must be updated,18 ' how many
witnesses 3 must execute the document,8 2 and who may be a
8
witness.

Further, living-will statutes in many jurisdictions make no
provision for health-care proxy appointments. Although some

174. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.090 (1986); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-212 (Michie
Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. § 765.17 (Supp. 1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-713
(West Supp. 1991); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-612 (1990); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 145B.16 (West Supp. 1992); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-111 (1991); New Jersey
Advance Directives for Health Care Act, ch. 201, § 24, 1991 N.J. Legis. Serv. 800,810
(West) (to be codified at N.J. STAT. ANN § 26:2H-75); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-13
(1991); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 3103.1 (Supp. 1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-111
(Supp. 1991); W. VA. CODE § 16-30-11 (Supp. 1991).
175. See, e.g., MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-612(b) (1990); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 145B.16 (West Supp. 1992); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 3103.1.A (Supp. 1990).
176. See supra note 150 and accompanying text. This problem could be alleviated
somewhat by noting the existence of a health-care directive on the back of a person's
driver's license, as organ donation preferences are currently noted. The new Patient
Self-Determination Act will require most hospitals to ask patients upon admission
whether they have a directive. See infra notes 194-200 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 151-52.
178. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
179. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-11-11(f) (West Supp. 1991); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 449.640(1) (1991); see also Condie, supra note 164, at 118-19.
180. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
181. See also Chapman, supra note 14, at 375 n.258 (describing various state
provisions). Compare CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7189.5 (Deering Supp. 1991)
(providing that a directive is effective for five years from the day of execution unless
it is revoked sooner) with IDAHO CODE § 39-4507 (Supp. 1991) (providing that a
directive is effective indefinitely from the day of execution unless it is revoked).
182. Compare ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-702(a) (West Supp. 1991)
(requiring two witnesses) with OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3103 (requiring two
witnesses and a notary public).
183. See Chapman, supra note 14, at 353. Compare ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A,
§ 5-702(a) (West Supp. 1991) (failing to exclude any person from being a witness)
with OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3103 (1990 Supp.) (excluding a long list of potential
witnesses).
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of these states have enacted separate health-care proxy
legislation, ten states and the District of Columbia have
not,8 4 thus providing no protection for patients who have
not met the requirements of the living-will provisions.
Finally, perhaps the biggest problem with living-will

statutes, and indeed with all advance-directive legislation, is
that the wide disparity between the states as to living-will
provisions and proxy appointment provisions promotes confusion, inequity, and forum shopping. Often, citizens of one
state do not have the same rights to continue or withhold
medical treatment as citizens of another. This has prompted
one commentator to remark that "'[n]ow, basic rights change
when you move across state borders.'""5 Americans are now
shopping for cities or states with more sympathetic laws on
many different social and medical issues, which creates a
trend that will burden a handful of states with the most
pressing and expensive problems. 8 '
In short, there is an enormous gap between America's need
and the current response to that need. For all of the foregoing
reasons, recent calls to revise URTIA,8 7 or to achieve general
legislative and judicial uniformity,'88 such as the Model AidIn-Dying Act,' 89 are laudable but incomplete. Certainly,
living-will legislation must be made more uniform. But
because living-will statutes generally do not address nonterminal patients, nor patients who have not executed any directives at all, more comprehensive legislation is needed.
Additionally, dicta in Cruzan now renders suspect those state
laws which do not recognize living wills or express proxy
appointments or directives to withhold artificial food and
hydration. 9 ° States must therefore considerably revamp
their existing legislation. Because Cruzan directed most

184. See supra note 163.
185. Tye, supra note 16, at 72 (quoting Ronald Collins, visiting professor of law
at Catholic University in Washington, D.C.).
186. Id.
187. See, e.g., Chapman, supra note 14; see also supra note 169.
188.
See, e.g., Karen M. Spallina, I Want to Die--OurConstitutionalRight to End
Artificial Life-Support, CHI. BAR ASS'N REC. 17, 21 (Jan. 1991) (advocating the
development of uniform national right-to-die legislation including standardized use
of living wills and durable power of attorney).
189.
Model Act, Model Aid-In-Dying Act, 75 IOWA L. REV. 125, 127-28 (1989)
(providing a model act that applies to terminally ill and "technologically dependent"
patients, includes a highly controversial provision that makes no distinction between
active and passive euthanasia, and provides no statutory hierarchy for surrogate
decision makers).
190. See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
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aspects of the problem back to the laboratory of the states, the
states must now provide more comprehensive and uniform
protection.
A new Uniform Patient-Family Determination Rights Act is
therefore needed. Efforts must be directed away from the
current piecemeal approach, which results in profoundly
disparate treatment across state lines and which is focused
almost exclusively on the problem long after much of it could
have been prevented. The new patient-family determination
rights movement must refocus and articulate three new goals:
1.

2.

3.

The movement must expend enormous effort and
resources on prevention, recognizing that it is always
best to effectuate the patient's own expressed wishes
whenever possible. Therefore it must increase the
legitimacy, enforceability, and the use of advance
health-care directives (up from the current 9%) to
avoid as many Cruzan-like tragedies as possible.
It must promote nationwide efforts to combine livingwill legislation with health-care proxy appointment
legislation in order to provide more comprehensive
coverage in the event of subsequent incompetency. It
can do this by protecting persistent vegetative state
patients and not just terminally ill patients, including
food and hydration within "medical treatment," and
making the directives more uniform and specific. 9 '
It must provide a catch basin for those thousands of
persistent vegetative state patients who have no
enforceable directive by providing in all fifty states a
statutory framework granting presumptive authority 192 to the patient's family to decide whether to
terminate or withhold life support based on a combined
"substituted judgment/best interest" analysis. 9 3 An
alternative framework should also be created for

191. See supra note 155.
192. The proposed Uniform Patient-Family Determination Rights Act sets forth
a statutory hierarchy of family members who may make decisions as surrogates when
no advance health-care directive is executed. See infra note 261 and accompanying
text; see also Rhoden, supra note 58, at 437 (advocating a legal presumption on behalf
of the family of the incompetent patient). The proposed legislation simply sets forth
a hierarchy of those surrogates who would be able to assist.
193. See infra note 261.
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incompetent patients without family members who
have left no executed directives.
As I discuss below, much of this groundwork has already
been done because national and state legislation that could be
used in part as a framework for a new Uniform Patient-Family
Determination Rights Act currently exists. Thus, it is important to note that the problem results not from a lack of legislation, but from a lack of coordinated effort. Efforts must be
directed not so much to creating even more new legislation,
but instead to coordinating and streamlining existing legislation. National goals must be rearticulated. The focus must
change to prevention, uniformity, and patient-family determination rights, and away from the existing parochial, confusing,
and inequitable piecemeal approach.

C. Federal Initiative:
The National Patient Self-DeterminationAct

The United States Congress recently answered the call for
far-reaching death-with-dignity legislation by enacting the
Patient Self-Determination Act (PSDA) as part of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990.194 An example of preventive legislation, the PSDA goes a long way toward increasing
Americans' awareness of advance health-care directives by
requiring the following from all hospitals, nursing homes,
hospices and other facilities that receive federal Medicaid and
other funding:
1.

2.

They are required to maintain written policies and
procedures with respect to all adults receiving medical
care by or through the provider or organization. 195
Upon a patient's admission to the facility, they must
inquire as to whether a patient has executed an
advance health-care directive; if a patient has not, the

194. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, §§ 4206,
4751, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-115 to -117, 1388-204 to -206 (effective Nov. 5, 1990) (to
be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395cc, 1395i-3, 13951, 1396a).
195. Id. § 4206(a)(2), 104 Stat. at 1388-115 (to be codified at § 1395cc(f)(1)).
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facility must advise the patient of relevant state law
and the opportunity to create a health-care directive
while competent.'9 6
If a patient has previously executed an advance
health-care directive, the facility must alert medical
treating personnel to the existence of the directive by
marking the patient's medical chart.'9 7
Treating personnel are directed to effectuate express
advance health-care directives, and a health-care
facility may not condition the provision of care or
otherwise discriminate against an individual based on
the individual has executed an adwhether or not 198
vance directive.

Failure on the part of a health-care facility receiving federal
funds to comply with the Act subjects it to a possible termination of federal funds; 199 as such, the Act requires those states
that do not recognize advance directives to enact such a law
and will withhold Medicaid reimbursement from those that do
not.
It is important to note that the new federal legislation defers
totally to local state law provisions with respect to living wills,
Thus,
health-care proxies, and other advance directives.20 0
the new federal legislation does not create any new rights for
patients; it only provides an opportunity to exercise existing
rights provided by state statute.
The PSDA is a laudable first nationwide effort to recognize
the pivotal importance of prevention in the death-with-dignity
debate. Cruzan suggests that there is a constitutional right

196. Id. (to be codified at § 1395cc(f)(1)(A)).
197. Id. (to be codified at § 1395cc(f)(1)(B)).
198. Id., 104 Stat. at 1388-115 to -116 (to be codified at § 1395cc(fQl)(C)-(D)).
However, the Act includes a "conscience clause" which recognizes the validity of state
laws allowing an individual health-care provider to refrain from implementing an
advance directive on the basis of conscience. Id. § 4206(c), 104 Stat. at 1388-116 (to
be codified at § 1395cc note).
199. Id. § 4206(b), 104 Stat. at 1388-116 (to be codified at §§ 1395mm(c)(8),
13951(r)).
200. Id. § 4206(a)(2), 104 Stat. at 1388-115 (to be codified at § 1395cc(f)(1)(A)(i))
(requiring only that the hospital inform the patient of "an individual's rights under
State law (whether statutory or as recognized by the courts of the State) to make
decisions concerning such medical care, including the right to accept or refuse
medical or surgical treatment and the right to formulate advance directives ...
(emphasis added)).
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for a competent person to withhold or withdraw life-support
systems, including feeding and hydration tubes. 2 1 The case
also suggests that where that individual has previously
created clear and convincing evidence of her own intent, such
as a living will, a guardian may terminate life support on her
behalf if she becomes incompetent." 2 The PSDA, therefore,
effectuates the Cruzan mandate by increasing the awareness
of and the opportunity for many Americans to generate legally
sufficient, clear and convincing evidence of their wishes while
they are still competent. It does so by directing them, upon
their admission to a covered health-care facility, to relevant
state law on living-will and health-care proxy appointments.
Thus, in cases involving those patients who have been
prompted to create in advance clear and convincing evidence
of their own wishes, the statute lifts a significant burden from
other parties, who no longer need to decide whether to
withhold or withdraw care. Ultimately, the patient's clear
wishes are effectuated and fewer cases should end up in court.
Successful implementation of this new legislation should
direct precious human, judicial, and financial resources away
from unnecessary and litigious dispute resolutions, and away
from unwanted artificial life support for those patients who
had the foresight to execute advance health-care directives.
Moreover, the legislation has the potential to affect millions of
lives because of its sweeping applicability to all types of
health-care facilities receiving federal funds.20 3
The effectiveness of the PSDA, however, is limited for at
least two reasons. First, because the Act only aids competent
adults who are capable of executing an advance health-care

201. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
203. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508,
§ 4751(a)(1)(c), 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-204 (to be codified at § 1396a(a)(57)). Senator
Danforth, a Senate cosponsor of the PSDA, noted that, "'For the first time, adult
patients will be provided with knowledge of their legal rights to make decisions about
their own care. This will occur in a systematic way that puts basic information in the
hands of millions of people.'" Keith White, Budget Bill Contains Medical Rights
Measure, Gannett News Serv., Oct. 29, 1990 (quoting Danforth), available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Wires File. See also 135 CONG. REC. S13,567 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1989)
(remarks of John C. Fletcher, Ph.D., Director of the Center of Biomedical Ethics,
University of Virginia Health Sciences Center) ("This Act will create literally millions
of such educational opportunities.").
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directive, it will not reach those who cannot or will not have
the opportunity to execute advance health-care directives.
Second, the Act defers completely to the existing state
legislative framework. °4 The PSDA is designed only to
discover whether a patient already has a health-care directive
and to advise the patient of the availability of advance healthcare directives in his health-care facility's jurisdiction, should
he wish to execute an advance directive. In short, the Federal
Act only waltzes the patient to the state door. As I have
discussed above," 5 the current piecemeal and patchwork
state legislative treatment of the death-with-dignity issue is
in total disarray, and its problems are legion. Unless and
until state legislatures provide a uniform and more comprehensive response, the PSDA simply feeds a patient into the
existing ineffective and inequitable state legislative framework.
As a result of these limiting factors, the PSDA does not
create any new rights; it merely advises a patient of existing
rights. Thus, for personal tragedies represented by Christine
Busalacchi, °6 for example, the PSDA serves no purpose at
all. It leaves unprotected those who cannot or have not
executed an advance health-care directive, and those whose
directives are legally insufficient. Thus, the Act fails to help
many people who are not covered by either their state's
legislation or Cruzan's constitutional reasoning.
In sum, the apparent goal of the PSDA-prevention-is
sensible, practical, and capable of averting much tragedy and
many wasted resources. Because the Act defers totally to
existing state patchwork legislation, however, the Act by itself
will not effectively or fully benefit even those it was designed
to protect until the states clean up the disarray in existing
living-will, proxy appointment, and other advance health-care
directive legislation. Finally, the Act fails to extend coverage
to individuals who have not executed an enforceable advance
health-care directive.
Thus, newly articulated goals of
uniformity and more comprehensive protection must also be
advanced.

204.
205.
206.

See supra note 200.
See supra notes 166-86 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 104-13 and accompanying text.
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III. NEWLY ENACTED AND PROPOSED
STATE LEGISLATION PROTECTING PATIENTS
WITHOUT ADVANCE HEALTH-CARE DIRECTIVES

In reality a large number of presently competent Americans
will never execute written advance health-care directives, nor
will they generate legally enforceable clear and convincing evidence of their own wishes. Their reasons may vary, from
feelings of invincibility often accompanying youth, to the lack
of access often faced by the elderly; many may simply choose
not to deal with questions of their own mortality. Moreover,
there is the additional reality that minors and mentally
incompetent persons are incapable of executing binding
advance health-care directives. These realities, along with
concern for the 10,000-25,000 persistent vegetative state
patients existing in the United States today, require further
legislative initiative.
Only one state, Illinois, 20 7 fully protects by legislative
enactment an incompetent, nonterminal individual who leaves
insufficient evidence of her own wishes, although some state
courts 20 and one federal court 20 9 have authorized decisions
by proxies on the basis of a patient's best interest or substituted judgment. Legal recognition of patient-family rights,
therefore, is grossly disproportionate to the nationalwish for
such protected rights.
For example, only recently have any types of patient-family
rights begun to find limited expression in state statutes.
While the great majority of states have not yet responded to
the problem, thirteen states now provide a surrogate decisionmaking procedure, which allows a surrogate to make medical
treatment decisions on behalf of an incompetent patient who

207.

See Health Care Surrogate Act, Pub. Act 87-749, 1991 Ill. Legis. Serv. 3507

(West) (to be codified principally at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, paras. 851-1 to -55);

see also infra notes 224-43 and accompanying text (discussing the Illinois Health
Care Surrogate Act).
208. As discussed extensively in Justice Stevens' Cruzan dissent, there are
numerous state court decisions which have "authorized procedures for the cessation
of treatment of patients in persistent vegetative states." Cruzan v. Director, Mo.
Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2887-88 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id.
at 2888 n.21 (citing cases). Justice Stevens argues that as a result, the Missouri
Supreme Court's Cruzan decision is "anomalous." Id. at 2888.
209. See Gray ex rel. Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988) (authorizing
the removal of a feeding tube from a patient in a persistent vegetative state).
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has left no advance health-care directive."' However, the
majority of those statutes apply only to terminally ill patients,
thus excluding persistent vegetative state patients from their
coverage.2 ' Some statutes also exclude artificial feeding or
hydration from the treatment that may be withdrawn by the
surrogate. 2
Thus, although a few states have begun recognizing patientfamily rights, under most existing statutory law neither Nancy
Cruzan, Helga Wanglie, nor Christine Busalacchi would be
protected, nor would their families. Existing statutory law is
not comprehensive or uniform enough to grant any of those
families presumptive rights to act on behalf of the patients to
continue or to withdraw medical treatment, including artificial
feeding and hydration. Uniform and more comprehensive laws
are necessary, and it is essential that they be passed in all
states.
The recently enacted Illinois Health Care Surrogate Act" 3
and legislation proposed in Missouri" 4 would fully protect

210. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-214 (Michie Supp. 1991); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 19a-571 (West Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. § 765.07 (1989); Health Care Surrogate
Act, Pub. Act 87-749, 1991 Ill. Legis. Serv. 3507 (West) (to be codified principally at
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 12, paras. 851-1 to -55); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.7 (West
1989); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.5 (West Supp. 1991); ME.REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18-A, § 5-707 (West Supp. 1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-8.1 (Michie 1991); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 90-322 (Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.635 (1989); TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 672.009 (West Supp. 1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1107 (Supp.

1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986 (Michie 1991). The New Mexico provision is the
only one that does not provide' a hierarchy of surrogate decision makers. See N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 24-7-8.1 (requiring consent "from all family members who are contacted
through reasonable diligence" (emphasis added)).
211. As of this writing, seven states restrict surrogate decision making to terminally ill patients only. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a571(2) (West Supp. 1991);
FLA. STAT. § 765.07(1) (1989); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.7(1) (West 1989); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.5(A)(1) (West Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.635(1)(a)
(1989); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 672.002(6) (West Supp. 1991); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 75-2-1107(1) (Supp. 1991).
212. Arkansas and Oregon expressly exclude artificial feeding and hydration
from medical treatment which may be withdrawn on this basis. See ARK. CODE
ANN. § 20-17-206(b) (Michie Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.605(3) (1989). Under
the New Mexico Right to Die Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-1 to -10 (Michie 1991), it
is unclear whether a surrogate decision maker may terminate artificial feeding and
hydration. The Act defines the "maintenance medical treatment" that may be
withdrawn as 'medical treatment designed solely to sustain the life process." Id.
§ 24-7-2(c). To date, there are no reported cases interpreting this provision.
213. Pub. Act 87-749, 1991 Ill. Legis. Serv. 3507 (West) (to be codified principally
at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 112, paras. 851-1 to -55.
214. Missouri Attorney General William Webster endorsed legislation in Missouri
which would have granted surrogate decision-making authority to withdraw
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patients like Helga Wanglie, Nancy Cruzan, and Christine
Busalacchi because they expressly apply to terminal and
nonterminal patients, including persistent vegetative state patients, and they expressly allow a surrogate to decide to
withhold medical treatment, including artificial feeding and
hydration, without an express advance directive and without
resort to the courts. Because the Illinois legislation is the
most comprehensive, 21 5 and because it broadly protects
individual autonomy rights as well as family rights, the new
Illinois act is discussed extensively below,2 16 following a brief
discussion of the Missouri proposal. This Article recommends
that Section Three of the proposed Uniform Patient-Family
Determination Rights Act pattern itself after the Illinois
legislation and the Missouri proposal because of the quality of
protection they provide.2 17
A. The Webster Proposal

In an arena already replete with paradox, the death-withdignity debate took another interesting turn in the spring of
1990. Missouri Attorney General William Webster, who, as
representative of Missouri Rehabilitation Center (a state
hospital), had opposed the Cruzans' legal fight to withdraw
their daughter's life-support system, 21' endorsed new legislation that would have provided increased protection for
persistent vegetative patients and their families. 219 The
legislation, which ultimately was not passed,22 ° would have
treatment, including food and water, for incompetent patients who have been
continuously unconscious for three or more years. See infra notes 218-23 and
accompanying text.
215. For example, the Illinois legislation carefully defines the factors that a
surrogate must take into account when deciding whether to withdraw or withhold
treatment. See infra notes 233-34 and accompanying text. Other states simply
require that decisions be made in the "best interest" of the patient. See, e.g., ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-707(d) (West Supp. 1991).
216. See infra notes 224-43 and accompanying text.
217. See infra note 261 and accompanying text.
218. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 410 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), affd sub
nom. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
219. See S. 508, 735 & 736, 85th Mo. G.A., 2d Sess. (1990); see also Gibbs, supra
note 61, at 62, 71. Webster is reported to have realized that few people have living
wills, and that the Cruzans' ordeal had been "torturous." Thus, he endorsed the
proposal for new legislation because it would try to find a careful resolution. Id.
220. The bill was placed on the Missouri Senate's "Informal Calendar" where it
died in 1991. MO. SENATE J., 85th G.A., 2d Sess. 862 (1990).
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allowed families of patients who had been continuously unconscious for three or more years to petition to withdraw medical
treatment, including artificial feeding and hydration, thus
allowing the patient to die.2 2 ' The family had to be unanimous in their opinion that this was what the patient would
have wanted,"' and three independent, nontreating physicians had to certify that the coma was irreversible.2 23 The
proposed initiative thus contained significant procedural safeguards against potential abuse.

B. The Illinois Health Care SurrogateAct

In a similar direct response to a local tragedy,2 24 the
Illinois General Assembly recently passed the broadestreaching legislation in the nation to date on the death-withdignity issue. The Illinois Health Care Surrogate Act 22
(HCSA) grants comprehensive legal rights to incompetent
patients to die with dignity. The legislation took two years to
pass both houses of the Illinois General Assembly and was
signed into law by Governor Jim Edgar on September 26,
1991.226 The bill is a sweeping and comprehensive measure

221.
S. 508 § A (to have been codified at Mo. REV. STAT. § 475.122(8)).
222. Id. (to have been codified at § 475.122(8)(3)).
223. Id. (to have been codified at § 475.122(8)(4)).
224. In April 1989, Rudy Linares, the 23-year old father of a 15-month old child
being treated in a Chicago hospital, entered the hospital armed with a .357 Magnum.
While holding medical personnel at bay, Linares disconnected his son's respirator.
See Peter Kendall, Panel Asks Legal Way to Halt Life Support, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 12,
1990, § 2, at 2. The child had swallowed a balloon which cut off oxygen to his brain,
and he had been in a vegetative state for several months. The hospital advised Linares
that they would not terminate the respirator. It was reported that Linares was
driven to desperation when the hospital called to tell him it was going to transfer his
child to a health facility 70 miles away. See Illinois: Panel Urges Right to Refuse
Life-Support, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1990, at A23. Following the Rudy Linares tragedy,
then-Cook County State's Attorney Cecil Partee created a Model Task Force composed
of lawyers, doctors, and ethicists. See Kendall, supra. One year later, the Task
Force, under the sponsorship of Senator John D'Arco (D-Chicago), introduced the first
version of the Illinois Health Care Surrogate Act. See infra note 226.
225. Pub. Act 87-749, 1991 Ill. Legis. Serv. 3507 (West) (to be codified principally
at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, paras. 851-1 to -55).
226. Senate Bill No. 2213, sponsored by Senator John D'Arco (D-Chicago) and
introduced April 6, 1990 in the Illinois General Assembly, set forth a new act entitled
the "Decisions to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment Act." See S. 2213, 86th Ill. G.A.
(1989-90). The proposed act would have established a rebuttable legal presumption
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and provides a very useful starting point for the proposed Uniform Patient-Family Determination Rights Act.
First, where an
The HCSA accomplishes five things.
met the Act's
capacity
and
has
lacks
decisional
individual
22
7
the HCSA provides a hierarchy of
"qualifying conditions,"
decision-making "surrogates," who have presumptive legal
authority228 to make a determination as to medical treatment (including artificial feeding and hydration) on behalf of
an incompetent patient who has left no evidence of, or
insufficient evidence of, her own personal wishes:
(a) When a patient has a qualifying condition and lacks
decisional capacity, . . . surrogate decision makers, as
identified by the attending physician, are then authorized
to make decisions whether to forgo life-sustaining treatment on behalf of the patient without court order or
judicial involvement in the following order of priority:
(1) the patient's guardian of the person;
(2) the patient's spouse;
(3) any adult son or daughter of the patient;
(4) either parent of the patient;
(5) any adult brother or sister of the patient;
(6) any adult grandchild of the patient;
(7) a close friend of the patient;
(8) the patient's guardian of the estate;
Where there are multiple surrogate decision makers at
the same priority level in the hierarchy, it shall be the
responsibility of those surrogates to make reasonable

setting forth a surrogate hierarchy for private decision making to forego life-sustaining
treatment. Id. § 7(c). Endorsed by the Chicago Tribune, the bill passed the Illinois
Senate but expired in an Illinois House Committee in June 1990 and was not
expected to be resurrected. See Donald B. Ayers, House Committee Kills Right-to-Die
Bill, UPI, June 6, 1990, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File. Reintroduced
one year later in amended form, see S. 1092, 87th Ill. G.A. (1991-92); H. 2334, 87th
Ill. G.A. (1991-92), the bill passed both Illinois houses and was approved on September 26, 1991. See HCSA, Ill. Legis. Serv. at 3514.
227. The Act defines "qualifying condition" as the existence, as certified by two
physicians, of one or more of the following conditions: "[tierminal condition," "[p]ermanent unconsciousness," or an "[i]ncurable or irreversible condition." HCSA § 10
(to be codified at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 851-10).
228. Id. § 30(a) (to be codified at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 851-30(a)).
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efforts to reach a consensus as to their decision on behalf
of the patient regarding the forgoing of life-sustaining
treatment....
(d) ...

In the event an individual in a higher, a lower,

or the same priority level or a health care provider seeks
to challenge the priority of or the life-sustaining treatment
decision by the recognized surrogate decision maker, the
challenging party may initiate guardianship proceedings
in accordance with the Probate Act of 1975.229

Second, the Act provides extensive procedural checks on
decision-making authority. These checks include requirements
that two physicians must certify the existence of "a qualifying
condition"; where appropriate among "same-level" surrogates,
a consensus must also exist among relevant family members
unless a minority institutes actual guardianship proceedings
under the Illinois Probate Act.23°
Third, the express purpose of the HCSA is to keep the
decision making private and out of the courts. 231 No petition

to the court is necessary for a family decision maker to terminate or withhold medical treatment. Instead, because of the
presumptive authority of the relevant family member or
surrogate to decide, courts only intervene when challenge
procedures are triggered upon a suggestion of impropriety or
undue bias under the Illinois Probate Act.232

229. Id. § 25 (to be codified at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 851-25).
230. Id. This is unlike the Webster proposal which requires unanimity. See supra
note 222 and accompanying text. Unfortunately, in the amended legislation that was
ultimately passed there are no express "dispute resolution" procedures set forth
which are designed solely to protect the incompetent from improper bias or undue
influence of family members, physicians, or others. An earlier version of the Act had
included such procedures. See S. 1092, 87th Ill. G.A. § 30 (1991-92).
231. The Act's "Legislative findings and purposes" section states:
Uncertainty and lack of clarity in the law concerning the making of private
decisions to forgo life-sustaining treatment, without judicial involvement, causes
unnecessary emotional distress to the individuals involved and unduly impedes
upon the individual right to forgo life-sustaining treatment.
The enactment of statutory guidelines for private decision making will bring
improved clarity and certainty ... and will substantially reduce the associated
emotional distress for involved parties.

Id. § 5(a) (to be codified at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 851-5).
232.

See id. § 25(d) (to be codified at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 851-25(d)).
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Fourth, the HCSA expressly directs a decision maker to use
a hybrid substituted judgment/best interest analysis. A surrogate decision maker is first required to make a decision based
on her substituted judgment:
A surrogate decision maker shall make decisions for the
adult patient conforming as closely as possible to what the
patient would have done or intended under the circumstances, taking into account ... the patient's personal,
philosophical, religious and moral beliefs and ethical
values relative to the purpose of life, sickness, medical
procedures, suffering, and death. Where possible, the
surrogate shall determine how the patient would have
weighed the burdens and benefits of initiating or continuing life-sustaining treatment against the burdens and
benefits of that treatment.2 3 3
If that is not possible, the surrogate is free to base her
decision on the patient's best interests:
If the adult patient's wishes are unknown and remain unknown after reasonable efforts to discern them or if the
patient is a minor, the decision shall be made on the basis
of the patient's best interests as determined by the
surrogate decision maker. In determining the patient's
best interests, the surrogate shall weigh the burdens on
and the benefits to the patient of initiating or continuing
life-sustaining treatment against the burdens and benefits
of that treatment ....
Thus, the legislation does away with the legal fiction of
substituted judgment 235 where it is inappropriate and authorizes a best interest determination where it is appropriate.

233. Id. § 20(b)(1) (to be codified at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 85120(b)(1)).
234. Id.
235. A number of scholars have examined the inconsistent and troubling
application of the fictional substituted judgment test to persistent vegetative state
patients. See Peters, supra note 58, at 940-42; Dresser, supra note 58, at 425-27; see
also Shapiro, supra note 129, at 445 ("[I]t is impossible to apply the substituted
judgment approach when incompetent patients... have no close family member or
friends, and knowledge of their values and previously expressed treatment
preferences is unavailable.").
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Fifth, the Act is more expansive than any other existing
legislation. Its surrogacy provisions are triggered by "qualifying conditions" which include a terminal condition where
death is imminent as well as "[p]ermanent unconsciousness."2 36 Interestingly, the HCSA goes one step further and
also protects the patient suffering from an incurable or
irreversible condition for whom death is not necessarily
imminent, but whose condition will ultimately cause his death
even if life-sustaining treatment is initiated or continued.2 3 v
This category is designed to cover patients like Tim Wirth,
who, suffering from advanced AIDS, was required by a court
to receive antibiotics to treat a serious brain infection,
contrary to expressed wishes he left in a previously executed
238
living will.
Finally, the Act guards against the potential for abuse. For
example, it expressly excludes "assisted feeding such as spoon
or bottle feeding" from its definition of "[a]rtificial nutrition
and hydration" that may be withdrawn. 23 9 The Act also
expressly provides that it "is not intended to condone, authorize, or approve mercy killing or assisted suicide."2 4 °
Of course, the HCSA applies only when no enforceable
express advance health-care directive is available;2 4 ' a competent individual is always free to make an advance healthcare directive and/or appoint a proxy other than a spouse or

236.
237.

HCSA § 10 (to be codified at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 12, para. 851-10).
Section 10, defining "qualifying condition," provides:

(3) "Incurable or irreversible condition" means an illness or injury (i) for
which there is no reasonable prospect of cure or recovery, (ii) that ultimately
will cause the patient's death even if life-sustaining treatment is initiated or
continued, (iii) that imposes severe pain or otherwise imposes an inhumane
burden on the patient, and (iv) for which initiating or continuing life-sustaining
treatment, in light of the patient's medical condition, provides only minimal
medical benefit.
Id. One possible example of a case which would fall under this definition of "qualifying condition" is the use of a respirator for a patient with terminal cancer who
develops pneumonia. Right to Die Law: A Sad Necessity, CHI. TRIB., June 6, 1990,
§ 1, at 18.
238. See Rosenthal, supra note 144.
239. HCSA § 10 (to be codified at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 851-10).
240. Id. § 5(b) (to be codified at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 851-5(b)).
241. By express provision the Act does not apply to instances in which the patient
has an operative living will or an authorized agent under a durable power of attorney
for health care. See id. § 15 (to be codified at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 12, para. 851-15).
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other family member to make a determination on her behalf
in the event of future incompetency. The Act therefore reposes
no power in a patient's family to veto a patient's own previously expressed wishes. Instead, the HCSA is a "catch basin"
designed to protect those individuals and their families who
currently are virtually unprotected by state legislation because
they never executed advance health-care directives.
The HCSA thus pays deference to three distinct sets of
rights: the patient's autonomy rights, by protecting him with
procedural safeguards against abuse through the provisions of
the Probate Act; the patient's right to have his family substitute its judgment on his behalf or act in his best interest; and
finally, the family's right to act on his behalf. The Illinois Act
is interesting because it recognizes what is intuitive for many
persons: that they would want their spouse, parent, adult
child, or other appropriate family member to decide on their
behalf if they were unable to make their own decision.24 2
By placing the decision back in the hands of the family, the
Act pays deference to the enormity and the difficulty of the
decision. In response to the Webster proposal in Missouri,
which also places the decision back into the families' hands,
one commentator wrote:
Long after the decision is made, the resolution may
continue to haunt. But, in a sense, the abiding difficulty
of these choices has a value of its own. It reflects the deep
desire to do the right thing and respect the wishes of a
loved one-and also an unshakable sense that life is
neither to be taken nor relinquished lightly, even in
mercy's name.2 43

Acknowledgment that "life is neither to be taken nor relinquished lightly, even in mercy's name"24 4 must come before
any new national legislative initiative.
In order to have legitimacy, any new initiative also must
safeguard against potential evils. The evil emerging from this

242. See Gibbs, supra note 61, at 64 (citing a Time/CNN poll, in which 80% of
those polled wanted family members and doctors to decide on their behalf in the
event they became incompetent).
243. Id. at 71.
244. Id.
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particular Pandora's box, of course, is the danger that an
incompetent individual may be subject to abuse by virtue of
her incompetency, and more broadly, that a right to die with
dignity can be perverted by society into a duty to die,245 or
a diminished commitment to the sanctity of life and the
protection of the vulnerable.2 4 6
Failure to act, however, must be distinguished from caution
in acting. Paradoxically, failure to act out of fear of abuse can
create abuse. Failure to act ignores the medical-technological
reality of modern death. Until thirty years ago, cessation of
heart and lungs-the medical definition of death at that
time-was the only other side of "life,"247 but now death is
not so neatly defined: We have created a new place where
human beings can be forced to remain suspended between life
and death.24 The failure to act also creates inequity in the
enforcement of important rights between families, between
citizens of different levels of competency, and between citizens
of different states.
The story of Pandora's box is similar to the concept of the
slippery slope: both represent the fear of a loss of control
where there is a potential for evil. Like the various evils that
fly out of Pandora's box unchecked and unguarded, we fear the
uncontrolled fall down the slippery slope. The proper response
to that fear, however, is not failure to act in a comprehensive,
uniform fashion. Failure to act deprives individuals and

245. Id. at 67.
246. For an excellent commentary on the danger of the "slippery slope," see
Cantor, supra note 25. I strongly support Cantor's suggestion that we draw the line
at a patient who is permanently unconscious (and not, for example, terminal but
conscious). See id. at 410. But cf Tracy L. Merritt, Note, Equality for the Elderly
Incompetent: A Proposal for a Dignified Death, 39 STAN. L. REV. 689, 690 (1987)
(arguing that the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment "should be extended to
include elderly incompetent but conscious patients with serious mental and physical
impairments" (footnote omitted)).
247. Shapiro, supra note 129, at 440. Shapiro proposes amending the current
"whole brain" definition of death under which death is. declared when all functions
of the brain and brain stem cease, id. at 440, to include those who are in a
permanently vegetative state, but only after diagnosis of permanent vegetative state
becomes more certain. Id. at 448.
248. Judge Teel in Nancy Cruzan's original evidentiary hearing, Cruzan v.
Harmon, No. CV 384-9P (Mo. Cir. Ct., Jasper County July 27, 1988), writes of man's
role in creating this new place: "Nancy's present unresponsive and hopeless existence
is not the will of the Supreme Ruler but of man's will to forcefully feed her while she
herself cannot swallow . . . ." Id., slip op. at 6.
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families of profoundly personal and inviolate rights. 249 The
proper response is to act cautiously. It is also to acknowledge
that the potential for evil exists and to create comprehensive
procedural safeguards to guard against it.
As discussed in Cruzan, Missouri's heightened evidentiary
standard provides one example of a procedural safeguard
against abuse. By requiring clear and convincing evidence of
a person's intent regarding the withholding or withdrawal of
medical treatment, the Missouri legislature and later the
Supreme Court placed the burden and the risk of error on the
one proposing to terminate life support. 2 ° The problem with
that particular procedural safeguard, standing alone, is that
it disenfranchises the large number of incompetent patients
without advance health-care directives (like Christine
Busalacchi) of any right to death with dignity. It also renders
legally irrelevant what the family believes the patient would
want, and what it believes is in her best interest.

IV. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION

This Article advocates that state and federal legislatures
completely reorient their focus on the death-with-dignity issue
and articulate three new national objectives: prevention,
uniformity, and patient-family determination rights.
Prevention is achieved through initiatives like the newly
enacted federal Patient Self-Determination Act,2 5 ' which
could positively affect millions of lives, 25 2 but only if it is
coordinated properly with the states. The proposition is a
simple one: If, as Cruzan holds, a state may require clear and
convincing evidence of a patient's wish to withhold or withdraw medical treatment, then we must make every effort to
generate legally enforceable clear and convincing evidence
while a patient is competent to leave such directions. Tragedies like Cruzan's and Wanglie's may be avoided by creating
a national awareness of the need and the opportunity to draft

249. In many writings, family relationships are viewed as sacred. See, e.g., JoHN
MASEFIELD, THE EVERLASTING MERCY 43 (1914) ("And he who gives a child a
home/Builds palaces in Kingdom come.").
250. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2854 (1990).
251. See supra notes 194-206 and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
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explicit advance directives for health care. Thus, prevention
is achieved by the increased use, recognition, and enforceability of advance health-care directives. Such directives
should effectuate the clearly expressed wishes of the patient
and are the best evidence of her intent.25 3 It should also
dramatically reduce the unnecessary grief families are put
through when they must make decisions on behalf of the
patient,25 4 or in the best interest of the patient,2 5 5 because patients will have left enforceable advance health-care
directives.
When it is reprioritized as a national objective, the doctrine
of prevention also recognizes that it is more humane to protect
citizens before a crisis develops than after. Further, a new
focus on prevention complements the Cruzan presumption that
certain of these rights are so fundamental as to be constitutionally protected by both the Fourteenth Amendment's liberty
interest and the common-law doctrine of informed consent.25 6
It also means that as a nation we can acknowledge and
respect the fact that "death with dignity" means different
things to different people, and that it is each individual's
definition of death with dignity that must be adhered to
whenever possible. In fact, the shift to prevention acknowledges that the very complexity of the questions "what is life"
and "what is death" triggers moral, ethical, medical, legal, and
religious concerns which virtually require an individual
response.
In short, the national shift in focus to prevention will
preempt the vast majority of death-with-dignity disputes.
More people will prepare advance health-care directives which
are uniform, clear and legally enforceable. This will avoid the
need for familial or judicial intervention.
Prevention alone, however, will not eliminate the problem.
The nation also needs a uniform statutory framework within
which to make necessary decisions. The primary fault of the
Patient Self-Determination Act is that it defers totally to

253. See Peters, supra note 58, at 936-37. But see Dresser, supra note 58, at
431-34 (discussing why an incompetent patient's former expressed wishes do not
represent the best evidence of the patient's present intent).
254. See supra note 58.
255. See supra note 92.
256. For a discussion of the development of a right to refuse treatment, first from
the common-law right to informed consent, and later from the constitutional privacy
right, see Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2846-47 (1990).
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existing state law. State and federal legislatures must commit
to developing a more uniform approach to this issue so as to
alleviate the existing inequity and confusion. This approach
must include a simpler legislative framework that protects
more people and, to the greatest extent possible, uniformly
protects rights across state lines. Existing legislation may be
used as a starting point, but it must be modified. The
Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act 257 (URTIA), the
separate Model Health-Care Consent Act,2 5 and all other
disparate patient determination legislation must be streamlined and combined into one complete and uniform act. This
would prevent confusion, unfairness, and forum shopping.
The recent Cruzan ruling as well as the current disarray in
state law provide a new opportunity for states to go back and
revise existing law. State legislatures, through the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws,2 5 9 should
revise existing law to reach more Americans before the crisis
arises, and to provide more comprehensive, enforceable protection when a crisis does arise.
Finally, the states must uniformly adopt new legislation
which thus far has not been part of most states' Natural Death
Acts. 2 0 This new legislation should recognize patient-family
determination rights by granting an incompetent patient's
family the presumptive legal right to make a determination to
withhold medical treatment on behalf of an incompetent
patient who has left no expressed wishes as to medical
treatment. This right should be available equally in every
state in the Union and should not vary between the states.
The definition of medical treatment should expressly include
artificial feeding and hydration. Finally, to protect against
abuse, the legislation should include procedural protections
257. URTIA, 9B U.L.A. 609 (1987). For an extensive discussion of URTIA, see
Chapman, supra note 14, at 320-21, which advocates revision of URTIA. This Article
draws on that suggestion and advocates that the 1989 version of URTIA, the Model
Health-Care Consent Act, and a brand new family-determination statute be subsumed into one Uniform Patient-Family Determination Rights Act.
258. 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 453 (1988). The Model Health-Care Consent Act sets forth,
in a separate statutory provision, model provisions for durable power of attorney for
health-care decisions. Id. § 6, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 464.
259. For an extensive discussion of the role of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws in the promulgation of uniform nationwide state statutory
provisions, see Chapman, supra note 14, at 343-55.
260. "Natural Death Act" is one of the titles some states have adopted for their
living-will statutes. See Condie, supra note 164, at 105, 107.
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such as waiting periods, physician certification requirements,
majority or unanimity requirements, and dispute resolution
mechanisms.
This Article proposes the framework for a new Uniform Act,
entitled the Uniform Patient-Family Determination Rights
Act. The proposed legislation should be an amalgam of
existing and new legislation, combined and streamlined into
essentially three parts. First, Section One should acknowledge and replicate the federal Patient Self-Determination Act,
and extend its coverage to include nursing homes and hospitals within the state, which are currently not covered by the
new federal law. This will provide all state residents in a
home or hospital with specific information regarding advance
health-care directives. Section Two of the Act should combine
existing URTIA and all proxy and durable powers of attorney
for health-care legislation, to cover all ill persons, whether
terminal or not, who leave advance health-care directives.
This will simplify the current disarray and will broaden
existing protection. Finally, to protect all those who are
currently unprotected, Section Three should be modeled after
the Illinois Health Care Surrogate Act to create a legally
enforceable hierarchy of surrogates to make the decision on
behalf of an individual who has not executed, or cannot
execute, her own advance directive. In the absence of an
advance health-care directive, it must give presumptive legal
authority to a patient's family to determine whether to
withhold or withdraw medical treatment for an incompetent
based on a combined substituted judgment/best interest
analysis.2 6 '
The proposed new legislative framework combines existing
law and advocates new law to protect those whom Cruzan
leaves unprotected. Although it presents a uniform hierarchy
of decision making, the proposed Uniform Act does not dictate
the outcome of the decision whether to continue or withhold
medical treatment. The great advantage of the proposed
Uniform Act is that it respects the complexity of the problem

261. The proposed Uniform Patient-Family Determination Rights Act should combine a "substituted judgment" analysis with a "best interest" analysis. A surrogate
may make a decision on behalf of an incompetent patient who meets the "qualifying
condition" requirement modeled after the new Illinois Health Care Surrogate Act.
See supra note 226; see also supra text accompanying note 234.
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as well as the diversity of answers. Thus, it effectuates
personal and familial autonomy and keeps private tragedies
out of public forums in all but the most compelling cases. 6 2
Granting presumptive legal authority to the family pursuant
to this proposed framework protects inviolate relationships
while yielding different results for different patients. For
example, application of the proposed Uniform Patient-Family
Determination Rights Act to the Busalacchi and Wanglie cases
should produce two different results because the Busalacchi
family believes strongly that Christine would want medical
treatment removed 263 and the Wanglie family strongly believed that Helga would wish her life support to be maintained. 2' Because neither patient left her own enforceable
expressed wishes, the proposed Uniform Patient-Family
Determination Rights Act would allow each family to effectuate those strong beliefs and to act on behalf of their loved one.
Christine would be allowed to die and Helga would be allowed
to remain on life support. The different results in these two
cases mirror and respect the deeply personal nature of the
decision each family must make; family members who know
the incompetent patient best must be given the opportunity to
effectuate what they believe the individual would want. To
best approximate the individual's wishes is to act in the best
interest of the family member. It validates the individual's
autonomy interest as well as the interests of his family.

CONCLUSION

According to at least one survey, many Americans do not
believe that the death-with-dignity issue is a legal issue at all.
Of those surveyed, 0% believed that the state should decide
when to withhold or terminate medical treatment, and only

262. Unlike the Illinois Health Care Surrogate Act, the Uniform Patient-Family
Determination Rights Act should provide a dispute mechanism. In the event of a dispute as to the withholding of medical treatment, resort should first be had to the
health-care facility Ethics Committee. Thereafter, resort should be had to the courts
if a successful resolution of the dispute is not yet effected. The amended Illinois
legislation resorts to the Illinois Probate Code for dispute resolution. See supra note
230. "Compelling cases" that may require judicial review of a resolution would
include cases where there is a suspicion of abuse, undue influence, or bias.
263. See Matchan, supra note 8, at 10.
264. See supra note 4.
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1% believed that the courts should decide.265 An overwhelming majority of Americans (95%) think that they themselves
266
should decide whether to withhold or terminate treatment;
barring that, an astonishingly high number (between 80% and
88%) think that a family member should decide for them if
they become incompetent to decide for themselves.6 7 Yet
there is no existing nationwide framework that facilitates and
effectuates this emerging national will.
A person's right to die is, of course, in some respects a legal
issue. The United States Constitution provides a minimum
floor of protection for individuals to die with dignity, that is
grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty
interests as reflected in Cruzan. Further, a state's parens
patriae or police power requires that state to protect the
sanctity of life and to protect the vulnerable from abuse.6 8
But it is more than just a legal issue. It is an issue with
profound religious, moral, ethical, and medical implications.
It is not an issue capable of easy resolution because it is not
an issue capable of only one resolution.
Consequently, it is imperative that the nation not fixate on
"one resolution" for everyone but instead refocus its attention
back to the individual. We must restate and rethink our
national objectives. In the past thirty years, medicine and
technology have created a brand new "suspended" place that
can sustain individuals indefinitely-a place somewhere
between life and death.269 The jurisprudential and legislative response to this new place is inadequate. Following
Cruzan, only competent persons are constitutionally allowed
to leave this suspended place, because only they can generate
the required clear and convincing evidence of their own wishes
before they slip into incompetency or terminal illness. Moreover, even the previously competent are hindered because the
patchwork and piecemeal response to the problem in state
legislatures means that persons in one state frequently do not

265. See Matchan, supra note 8, at 10.
266. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text. If, as I suggest, the goal of
any statutory hierarchy is to replicate the proxy choices a competent person might
make, further statistical study is needed to analyze which persons competent
individuals most frequently choose as health-care proxies.
268. For an exhaustive discussion of the four state interests identified in the
right-to-die debate, see Peters, supra note 58.
269. See supra notes 128, 248.
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have the same rights as persons in another. The current
patchwork approach causes confusion, inequity, and forum
shopping. Judicial resolution of the issue on a case-by-case
basis will also be inadequate. Less than six months after the
Supreme Court's landmark decision in Cruzan, for example,
the nation already was faced with a "reverse Cruzan"case and
a "Cruzan dissent" case.
What is needed, therefore, is a coordinated state and federal
program. New priorities must be articulated. These new
priorities should be prevention, uniformity and patient-family
determination rights. The federal Patient Self-Determination
Act goes a long way toward shifting national awareness to
prevention of the problem. Because it defers totally to the
disparate laws of the fifty states, however, the Patient SelfDetermination Act will not achieve its objective of prevention
until state legislatures revise their existing advance healthcare directive laws. As noted above, the primary problem with
the federal legislation is that it only waltzes the patient to the
state's front door.
The proposed framework for a Uniform Patient-Family
Determination Rights Act furthers the emerging national will
by doing three things: it works in conjunction with the new
federal legislation to advise Americans of their rights; it brings
clarity and uniformity to the existing law on advance healthcare directives; and, for the first time, it fully and uniformly
legislatively protects those who have not and will not execute
an advance health-care directive.
By changing the national focus to prevention and uniformity,
private tragedies like Cruzan and Wanglie may be kept out of
the public forum. Presumably, as previously competent, adult,
married women, Helga Wanglie and Nancy Cruzan-had they
had an opportunity to do so easily-might have prepared
written advance health-care directives. Had they done so,
their cases would likely never have gotten to court and their
protected individual autonomy interests would have been fully
actualized.
Any new national initiative, however, must also fully protect
all incompetent patients. Any proposed Uniform PatientFamily Determination Rights Act must recognize the reality
that thousands of citizens, now and in the future, will not or
cannot generate clear and convincing evidence of their own
wishes. By establishing a hierarchy of authority and granting
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family members "presumptive rights" to act on behalf of the
patient, the proposed legislation, based on the new Illinois Act
and the Missouri proposal, will protect the rights of the
incompetent individual-her rights to patient autonomy and
to have a family member decide on her behalf-as well as the
rights of her family. Any proposed uniform act must also
protect incompetents without families by including in the
hierarchy guardians, friends, and third parties who, where
appropriate, may act in the best interests of an incompetent
who has left no express directive.
Procedural safeguards for both competent and incompetent
patients must be streamlined and made uniform. Procedural
safeguards are necessary to protect all patients who, by virtue
of their illness (and often, advanced age) are extremely
vulnerable.
Finally, procedural safeguards recognize the
possibility of a slippery slope and provide concrete control over
the possibility of abuse. These safeguards should include:
medical certification by independent physicians of requisite
"qualifying conditions"; extensive waiting periods; the requirement of family unanimity, or "majority approval" where
appropriate; and the creation of legal presumptions which are
rebuttable and subject to judicial review.
Recent medical technology now makes it imperative. To
respect the sanctity of life we must also acknowledge the
sanctity of death. ' ° Persons should not be denied fundamental rights because they live in different states or because
they are very young or very old or, for whatever reason, fail to
provide sufficient evidence of their own interests regarding the
decision to withdraw or withhold medical treatment.
Finally, respecting the sanctity of life also means respecting
the sanctity of the family. The proposed coordinated state and
federal campaign places primary emphasis on prevention and
uniformity and thus, wherever possible, keeps the hard
decisions in the hands of the best decision makers-the individuals themselves. By placing presumptive decision-making
authority in family members' hands, it also provides the same

270. Former Senator Jacob Javits, upon contemplation of his own terminal illness
and total paralysis, beautifully stated, "[Als the Bible teaches, the road which opens
with birth leads to the grave. Birth and death are the most singular events we
experience and, therefore, the contemplation of death as of birth should be a thing
of beauty and not of ignobility." Dying with Dignity: Difficult Choices, Hearing
Before the House Select Committee on Aging, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1985)
(testimony of former Sen. Jacob Javits).
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opportunity for death with dignity to thousands of incompetent
patients who, until now, have been disenfranchised and locked
in a new, ignoble 271 place, suspended between life and
death 272-a place which is neither of their creation nor of
their choosing.

271.
272.

See supra note 270.
See supra note 128.

